Re: [Rats] 答复: use case document updates on Roots of Trust

The definition of a trust anchor does not limit the scope to certificate chains. 

> On Sep 16, 2019, at 8:51 PM, Xialiang (Frank, Network Standard & Patent Dept) <frank.xialiang@huawei.com> wrote:
> 
> Hi Carl,
> The other big difference between them is the object they deal with: RoT is for integrity measurement value chain, CA is for certificate chain.
> 
> Hope it is helpful.
> 
> B.R.
> Frank
> 
> -----邮件原件-----
> 发件人: RATS [mailto:rats-bounces@ietf.org] 代表 Carl Wallace
> 发送时间: 2019年9月16日 20:26
> 收件人: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>; Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com>
> 抄送: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>; rats@ietf.org
> 主题: Re: [Rats] use case document updates on Roots of Trust
> 
> I took Rich's statement to be more from a relying party perspective and your detail to be more what one might find in a policy describing nature of the root of trust, which is not that different from how one may describe a trust anchor/CA in a PKIX context in a policy that describes how a CA are operated, etc. Two sides of the same coin.
> 
> On 9/15/19, 4:50 PM, "RATS on behalf of Laurence Lundblade"
> <rats-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of lgl@island-resort.com> wrote:
> 
>>> On Sep 12, 2019, at 3:31 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> I do not see a meaningful difference between "trust anchor" and 
>>> "trust root" and "root(s) of trust."  All of them:
>>>    - Are pieces of data (certificate or key is not meaningful)
>>>    - Used to verify something such as a certificate or signature
>>>    - Are trusted by the application, based on actions that are "out of 
>>> band" of the application itself
>> 
>> This is not how I understand a root of trust, nor how I think it is 
>> generally used in the TCG or TEE worlds. I think a root of trust 
>> involves a CPU, memory and SW that actively does something like boot 
>> and measure a device. There is usually a boundary around it so that 
>> other software on the device, like the high-level OS, can’t corrupt it. 
>> When it is doing reporting as in RATS it will have a private key that can do some signing.
>> When it is doing trusted/secure boot, it will also have a public key to 
>> verify the software it loads.
>> 
>> LL
>> 
>> 
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> 
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