Re: [Rats] Quantum-safe attestation

"Panwei (William)" <william.panwei@huawei.com> Tue, 25 August 2020 02:22 UTC

Return-Path: <william.panwei@huawei.com>
X-Original-To: rats@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: rats@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 71A3E3A0F2E for <rats@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 24 Aug 2020 19:22:10 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.001
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.001 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id T3fY8h-jVex8 for <rats@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 24 Aug 2020 19:22:08 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from huawei.com (lhrrgout.huawei.com [185.176.76.210]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8A64F3A0949 for <rats@ietf.org>; Mon, 24 Aug 2020 19:22:08 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from lhreml710-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.7.106]) by Forcepoint Email with ESMTP id 32D01273F6BCDB6EAD17; Tue, 25 Aug 2020 03:22:05 +0100 (IST)
Received: from nkgeml708-chm.china.huawei.com (10.98.57.160) by lhreml710-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.61) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.1913.5; Tue, 25 Aug 2020 03:22:04 +0100
Received: from nkgeml705-chm.china.huawei.com (10.98.57.154) by nkgeml708-chm.china.huawei.com (10.98.57.160) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.1913.5; Tue, 25 Aug 2020 10:22:01 +0800
Received: from nkgeml705-chm.china.huawei.com ([10.98.57.154]) by nkgeml705-chm.china.huawei.com ([10.98.57.154]) with mapi id 15.01.1913.007; Tue, 25 Aug 2020 10:22:01 +0800
From: "Panwei (William)" <william.panwei@huawei.com>
To: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
CC: "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Rats] Quantum-safe attestation
Thread-Index: AQHWekEXO/hHx4ve/0iCTlgTs0mom6lHPSqAgAASkoCAAMVAQA==
Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2020 02:22:01 +0000
Message-ID: <b7e3ca1ba4624f259eeea84869faa291@huawei.com>
References: <B12C563A-066F-4FB7-934D-48D1373206E5@island-resort.com> <28631.1598303815@localhost> <265F46D1-76F8-4B0B-9390-AB15A44E0B0D@island-resort.com>
In-Reply-To: <265F46D1-76F8-4B0B-9390-AB15A44E0B0D@island-resort.com>
Accept-Language: zh-CN, en-US
Content-Language: zh-CN
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
x-originating-ip: [10.164.120.6]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/l11izp-AXYnDXYy72eXdgmYRPac>
Subject: Re: [Rats] Quantum-safe attestation
X-BeenThere: rats@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: Remote ATtestation procedureS <rats.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/rats>, <mailto:rats-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/rats/>
List-Post: <mailto:rats@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:rats-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats>, <mailto:rats-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2020 02:22:10 -0000

> Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com> wrote:
> 
> I don’t want the RATS architecture to pick one algorithm or go into detail
> about algorithms.
> 
> I expect the RATS architecture to be fully flexible to use what ever
> algorithms can do the job. In particular it must not assume PKI. Most other
> crypto-using IETF standards do not assume PKI. They often work better with
> PKI, but they allow for other algorithms. RATS needs to be the same.
> 
> The particular manifestation I can think of for RATS is that Endorsements
> must support confidentiality. If endorsements do not support
> confidentiality an assumption that only PKI-based attestation can be used
> is made.

The characteristics of Endorsement depend on what the Endorsement is. I don't feel current architecture assumes the Endorsements are PKI-based or limits the algorithms to only use PKI.

Regards & Thanks!
Wei Pan

> 
> I don’t know of any other manifestations that moving to quantum-safe
> crypto would have on the architecture, but it seems worth thinking
> through.
> 
> LL
> 
> 
> 
> > On Aug 24, 2020, at 2:16 PM, Michael Richardson
> <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> wrote:
> >
> >
> > Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com> wrote:
> >> We probably want RATS architecture to be able to use quantum-safe
> >> algorithms. On low cost and low speed devices that might mean HMAC
> is
> >> used since SHA-2 and such seem to be quantum-safe. On higher cost
> and
> >> higher speed devices there may be alternatives that look more like
> >> PKI.
> >
> > Yes/no.
> >
> > Use of a keyed HMAC requires a symmetric key, which will be a hassle
> > to provision the verifier, and effectively locks the device to a single (likely
> > manufacturer provided) verifier.   It will also raise questions of
> > non-repudiation.
> > Better *might* be RFC8778 HSS/LMS Hash-Based Signature Algorithms.
> > They are bigger, and have a limited number of uses.
> >
> > I would say that the architecture does not need to say anything about
> > the algorithms.  These are functional requirements, not design
> requirements.
> >
> > There will have to be firmware updates to the Attesting Environment
> > once either we have quantum-safe asymmetric algorithms, or when we
> > have a QM breach.  That can be done with SUIT signed by RFC8778.
> > I don't think that our architecture need worry about that.
> >
> > --
> > Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>ca>, Sandelman Software
> Works
> > -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-
> > _______________________________________________
> > RATS mailing list
> > RATS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
> 
> _______________________________________________
> RATS mailing list
> RATS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats