Re: [Rats] Quantum-safe attestation

> Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com> wrote:
> 
> I don’t want the RATS architecture to pick one algorithm or go into detail
> about algorithms.
> 
> I expect the RATS architecture to be fully flexible to use what ever
> algorithms can do the job. In particular it must not assume PKI. Most other
> crypto-using IETF standards do not assume PKI. They often work better with
> PKI, but they allow for other algorithms. RATS needs to be the same.
> 
> The particular manifestation I can think of for RATS is that Endorsements
> must support confidentiality. If endorsements do not support
> confidentiality an assumption that only PKI-based attestation can be used
> is made.

The characteristics of Endorsement depend on what the Endorsement is. I don't feel current architecture assumes the Endorsements are PKI-based or limits the algorithms to only use PKI.

Regards & Thanks!
Wei Pan

> 
> I don’t know of any other manifestations that moving to quantum-safe
> crypto would have on the architecture, but it seems worth thinking
> through.
> 
> LL
> 
> 
> 
> > On Aug 24, 2020, at 2:16 PM, Michael Richardson
> <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> wrote:
> >
> >
> > Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com> wrote:
> >> We probably want RATS architecture to be able to use quantum-safe
> >> algorithms. On low cost and low speed devices that might mean HMAC
> is
> >> used since SHA-2 and such seem to be quantum-safe. On higher cost
> and
> >> higher speed devices there may be alternatives that look more like
> >> PKI.
> >
> > Yes/no.
> >
> > Use of a keyed HMAC requires a symmetric key, which will be a hassle
> > to provision the verifier, and effectively locks the device to a single (likely
> > manufacturer provided) verifier.   It will also raise questions of
> > non-repudiation.
> > Better *might* be RFC8778 HSS/LMS Hash-Based Signature Algorithms.
> > They are bigger, and have a limited number of uses.
> >
> > I would say that the architecture does not need to say anything about
> > the algorithms.  These are functional requirements, not design
> requirements.
> >
> > There will have to be firmware updates to the Attesting Environment
> > once either we have quantum-safe asymmetric algorithms, or when we
> > have a QM breach.  That can be done with SUIT signed by RFC8778.
> > I don't think that our architecture need worry about that.
> >
> > --
> > Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software
> Works
> > -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-
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> 
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