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[Rats] device attestation and ACME

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Wed, 20 July 2022 22:41 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: rats@ietf.org, acme@ietf.org
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Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2022 18:41:44 -0400
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Subject: [Rats] device attestation and ACME
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I read acme-device-attest, and I guess the key part is a new device-attest-01
method.

https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-bweeks-acme-device-attest-00.html#name-device-attestation-challeng

tries to explain the format, and how the challenge is signed by the device.
What I do not understand is any of the trust relationships between the ACME
server and the manufacturer/provisionor of the Android Key Attestation/Chrome
OS Verified Access/Trusted Platform Module.

Why does the Enterprise trust the attestation key?

-- 
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-

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