[Raven] Final comments on draft

Chris Savage <chris.savage@crblaw.com> Fri, 04 February 2000 23:11 UTC

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From: Chris Savage <chris.savage@crblaw.com>
To: "IETF Wiretapping List (E-mail)" <raven@ietf.org>
Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 18:06:00 -0500
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Subject: [Raven] Final comments on draft
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Here's what I have on Section 6:

6. Security considerations

[[[Replace this:]]]

Wiretapping, by definition (see above), releases information that the
information sender did not expect to be released.

[[[With this:]]]

Wiretapping, by definition (see above), releases information that the sender
did not expect to be released.

[[[Replace this:]]]

This means that a system that allows wiretapping has to contain a function
that can be exercised without alerting the information sender to the fact
that his desires for privacy are not being met.

[[[With this:]]]

This means that a system that allows wiretapping has to contain a function
that can be exercised without alerting the sender to the fact that his
desires for privacy are not being met.

[[[Replace this:]]]

This, in turn, means that one has to design the system in such a way that it
cannot guarantee any level of privacy; at the maximum, it can only guarantee
it as long as the function for wiretapping is not exercised.

[[[With this:]]]

This, in turn, means that any system designed to permit wiretapping cannot
guarantee any level of privacy; the most such a system can guarantee is that
privacy will exist if the wiretapping function is not exercised.  But since
any effective wiretapping design will conceal the operation of the
wiretapping function from the sender, the sender can never be assured of
privacy.


. . .

[[[Replace this:]]]

Wiretapping, even when it is not being exercised, therefore lowers the
security of the system.

[[[With this:]]]

It follows that wiretapping, even when it is not being exercised, lowers the
security of the system.

*************************************************

As I said much earlier, I think the draft is a good job.  All of my comments
are intended to clarify the language and improve readability.  Both of these
are to some extent in the eye of the beholder, so I haven't made much of an
effort to explain or justify any particular proposed change.  If anyone is
interested or has any comments, I'd be happy to respond.

Chris S.
All views/opinions are my own...




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