Re: [re-ECN] CONEX Principles & Constraints

[Bob Briscoe <[e-mail]>]

Folks,

At 23:20 01/11/2009, Leslie Daigle wrote:
>John Leslie wrote:
>>
>>>>14. we will describe threats, especially from falsifying or
>>>>suppressing the conex information - whether by ISPs or end-hosts.
>>>>The protocol needs to allow such threats to be dealt with (in as
>>>>simple a manner as possible), but the actual mechanisms to tackle
>>>>those threats (using policer boxes, for instance) are out of scope.
>>>>Reason: such mechanisms are about uses of conex, rather than exposing
>>>>the information.
>>    I agree.

Suggest we replace the middle sentence with:

The protocol must support at least one simple mechanism that can 
tackle those threats without compromising any other principles and 
constraints, but standardisation of a particular mechanism is out of scope.

[[[Reason: The ability to counter cheating, particularly by single 
packet flows, introduces all the toughest constraints on the 
protocol. Saying the actual mechanisms are out of scope precludes us 
from considering whether even one nominal mechanism will be feasible 
without compromising other constraints. ]]]


>>>>15. anything else?
>>    Not at this time.

I have a very subtle principle to add:

15. Spontaneously cooperative behaviour between end-systems and 
between networks and end-systems should not be precluded or 
discouraged by any measures designed to prevent cheating or to 
encourage cooperation.


BOb

>>--
>>John Leslie <[e-mail]>

________________________________________________________________
Bob Briscoe,                                BT Innovate & Design