Re: [regext] Privacy and HR considerations for draft-ietf-regext-verificationcode

Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com> Wed, 02 January 2019 20:32 UTC

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To: John R Levine <johnl@taugh.com>, "Gould, James" <jgould@verisign.com>
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From: Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com>
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Date: Wed, 02 Jan 2019 14:31:53 -0600
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Subject: Re: [regext] Privacy and HR considerations for draft-ietf-regext-verificationcode
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[as an individual]

On 1/2/19 12:10 PM, John R Levine wrote:
>> The 2119 words MUST and MAY are used to signify requirements; 
>> although that does imply interoperability as well.  This statement is 
>> associated with making the verification code functional, since the 
>> verification code represents a signed and typed verification pointer, 
>> it must point to something.
>
> I don't understand why.  The code is a signed token.  Imagine the 
> registry goes back to the signer asks about token 123-foo666 and the 
> answer is "We're the Ministry, we signed it, of course it's valid.  
> The details are secret."
>
> While that would not be my favorite way to work, and I can easily 
> imagine other scenarios with auditing and transparency business 
> requirements, why wouldn't that interoperate?


If we're concerned merely with interoperation, the same is true of most 
-- if not all -- normative keywords used in "Security Considerations" 
sections. Your position might (or might not) be correct, but the logic 
of "2119 language is only used for interoperabilty reasons" simply isn't 
true.

/a