Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-over-http
"Gould, James" <jgould@verisign.com> Wed, 30 March 2022 20:12 UTC
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From: "Gould, James" <jgould@verisign.com>
To: "mario.loffredo@iit.cnr.it" <mario.loffredo@iit.cnr.it>, "regext@ietf.org"
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Thread-Topic: Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-over-http
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Subject: Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-over-http
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Mario, I provide feedback embedded below. -- JG [cid:image001.png@01D84450.DDD4E8A0] James Gould Fellow Engineer jgould@Verisign.com<applewebdata://13890C55-AAE8-4BF3-A6CE-B4BA42740803/jgould@Verisign.com> 703-948-3271 12061 Bluemont Way Reston, VA 20190 Verisign.com<http://verisigninc.com/> From: Mario Loffredo <mario.loffredo@iit.cnr.it> Date: Wednesday, March 30, 2022 at 1:10 PM To: James Gould <jgould@verisign.com>om>, "regext@ietf.org" <regext@ietf.org> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-over-http Hi James, here are again my responses below. Il 30/03/2022 15:59, Gould, James ha scritto: Mario, I include my feedback embedded below. -- JG [cid:image002.png@01D84450.DDD4E8A0] James Gould Fellow Engineer jgould@Verisign.com<applewebdata://13890C55-AAE8-4BF3-A6CE-B4BA42740803/jgould@Verisign.com> 703-948-3271 12061 Bluemont Way Reston, VA 20190 Verisign.com<http://secure-web.cisco.com/1gQlgRW72aj9NC17lGneJe5U9iv40YorDLQeevsbRB0uN549sJtcx2h6AcX90vvTSIQKRY4ndEf784mKH0KqneZZACedjxciuZ_2i5ToIlwfFAGz707PB6ezlmAVSdaxYJbXUL7YKe733dDfgfhwhGI412ZDZ1_V2ISZFA4x-iBtNPSKGxKiysCgQ5_pgihZhUjh1fMc1kM4uurdvSqaMLoP3chr6MvD9J4V2E-ecw_bhzCITkyHMoUmBAIEMSbi6/http%3A%2F%2Fverisigninc.com%2F> From: Mario Loffredo <mario.loffredo@iit.cnr.it><mailto:mario.loffredo@iit.cnr.it> Date: Wednesday, March 30, 2022 at 8:28 AM To: James Gould <jgould@verisign.com><mailto:jgould@verisign.com>, "regext@ietf.org"<mailto:regext@ietf.org> <regext@ietf.org><mailto:regext@ietf.org> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-over-http Hi James, my comments are embedded below. Il 29/03/2022 17:50, Gould, James ha scritto: Mario, My responses are embedded below. -- JG [cid:image003.png@01D84450.DDD4E8A0] James Gould Fellow Engineer jgould@Verisign.com<applewebdata://13890C55-AAE8-4BF3-A6CE-B4BA42740803/jgould@Verisign.com> 703-948-3271 12061 Bluemont Way Reston, VA 20190 Verisign.com<http://secure-web.cisco.com/1fmebMbwOUgdo-WyMaIsLZ1SH_XvKhWjFsvhnqk29yAQF2aCDU1bQl0rsVTtHPLG2BkDpIZ4MRjQsieE6r3TIX1L0ZZ7ekjXpaFeAZJDrC_Po6vguQRG0GQxM_3QyDX71rQvTjctNCis34Eb3FlrargkQgR5XO62fk7y3kgDfQM3nIcfYBm16faG667F4c9QVNETKgFbhSeqgY14mUJuMb_4AAv736hwPtIFaeVSRpYMMCGp1ZN1ut0cVsLLpuUa2/http%3A%2F%2Fverisigninc.com%2F> From: Mario Loffredo <mario.loffredo@iit.cnr.it><mailto:mario.loffredo@iit.cnr.it> Date: Tuesday, March 29, 2022 at 11:00 AM To: James Gould <jgould@verisign.com><mailto:jgould@verisign.com>, "regext@ietf.org"<mailto:regext@ietf.org> <regext@ietf.org><mailto:regext@ietf.org> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-over-http Hi James, Il 29/03/2022 13:41, Gould, James ha scritto: Mario, My feedback is embedded below. -- JG [cid:image004.png@01D84450.DDD4E8A0] James Gould Fellow Engineer jgould@Verisign.com<applewebdata://13890C55-AAE8-4BF3-A6CE-B4BA42740803/jgould@Verisign.com> 703-948-3271 12061 Bluemont Way Reston, VA 20190 Verisign.com<http://secure-web.cisco.com/1EaISbPmlOZzCKgUuIbmDA4rr-y-fT4gnfY0xiPotQBQC-vNT5PBKwJ1STPDcTK6y65BpvZgT5XqntG_ZysxPVZX8XjGyZXOW-P8nL-bdEwKNOkYvtyGhf1-PjTUP3gKykqkaX6QProvtyfCBkgC_m9J8xcE7yHeQ2_JycG85cc1JtO74KeQ6D9bsl9tHxNpgzRFA-IE_CZkI01GCY0-9LRrY2Tdd3mwPuBMAXYl7okYjJdszZFa2vwEdisCoAWAN/http%3A%2F%2Fverisigninc.com%2F> From: Mario Loffredo <mario.loffredo@iit.cnr.it><mailto:mario.loffredo@iit.cnr.it> Date: Monday, March 28, 2022 at 6:59 AM To: James Gould <jgould@verisign.com><mailto:jgould@verisign.com>, "regext@ietf.org"<mailto:regext@ietf.org> <regext@ietf.org><mailto:regext@ietf.org> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-over-http Hi James, thanks for ypur quick reply. Please find my comments below. Il 25/03/2022 16:45, Gould, James ha scritto: Mario, For #4 “Cookie vs. HTTP Connection”, you asked the question “can you further clarify why we should opt for establishing the cookie at setup of the connection and how should it be possible? For example, what kind of request should be used to start the HTTP connection?”. I implemented pluggable transports in the Verisign EPP SDK, which included HTTP, HTTPS, TCP, and TLS. The Verisign EPP SDK does include a client interface as well as a server stub implementation, so I was able to see the transports from both sides. Support for HTTP and HTTPS was removed once we stopped supporting EPP over HTTP. The cookie is setup at the time of the HTTP or HTTPS connection. There is no “request” that is used to start the HTTP connection, just like the case for TCP and TLS. A network connection is made, which includes the underlying TLS handshake in the case of HTTPS and TLS and the cookie is setup for HTTP and HTTPS, and then the EPP application protocol rides on top of it. It seems to me a very low-level implementation. Sorry but I stiil don't understand how cookies are returned. They should be returned in an HTTP response that doesn't correspond to an HTTP request. Correct? JG: HTTP is being defined as a transport for EPP, so it should be treated as such. The setup and tear-down of the HTTP connection, includes the setup of the cookies that is used for HTTP session tracking. When a connection is made to the EPP / HTTPS server, the TLS connection is first established via the TLS-handshake and the HTTP session is established via setup of the session cookie (e.g., JSESSIONID), which then enables the server to maintain state. State such as tracking failed login attempts and timeouts (idle / command / absolute), which will result in a drop in the HTTP session / connection when the login attempt threshold is exceeded. At the application layer, a HTTPS connection is treated in the same way as a TLS connection, where the transport handles the framing and the connection state, and the application layer returns the EPP Greeting when the connection is setup and drops the connection with a EPP logout occurs or other EPP session conditions (e.g., exceeding timeouts). The HTTP session cookie is returned in all the HTTP responses. There is absolutely no intermingling of the transport layer (HTTP) with the application layer (EPP) other than making a connection available to read and write framed packets and the ability to close the connection when needed. If so, it seems to me uncompliant with what is stated in the first paragraph of Section 2.1 of RFC7230: HTTP is a stateless request/response protocol that operates by exchanging messages (Section 3<https://secure-web.cisco.com/1HLyHB_XdFEjfXQwGFkG0LZSLLnG4WFNvmZ-TNjfY6OfIaLTmL1biILbx72S_U5GmIiJtbpg0x39TJ52od6XvJJ-XGkebzBiEggAwQ42v85iZAXdc75eWbMUFwdy__GSQvGqoc_3jBcXvzaJksIZ9kIaGCObuN4sNz3NQqB4Gsr44Gdw9c4U6nDx9j_3kyp9hk3Za8zxK-CiPfgUAyNLhZ53ksc5Ae9PHvSSpW9kjbB9txLir0tvwL_pUPzDpJS2Y/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.rfc-editor.org%2Frfc%2Frfc7230%23section-3>) across a reliable transport- or session-layer "connection" (Section 6<https://secure-web.cisco.com/1vvJc-KSBR_KweDtRuo-dlLx6E_Z9fnj9TRqKJPKmI-z_MzpIyDJWDzfwvS180O64nU4M_K-HwHtvVlPkTyfnMVQ8I50S_dOCSrwzrW9QXz8ckfa9Yj0UZmgPk4aOBSCgpizCtKhPiufait2c-bik8SwDi5FGriXh2QetIDOP_N5qvkVGUCrJ7Agu0Kz55-5IRTrJpPK2rtdg6AYpfgj-5oaNCOjZ9kZcI233HN_HumLXDVcKmYklOTTqh_7mGPwt/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.rfc-editor.org%2Frfc%2Frfc7230%23section-6>)6>). An HTTP "client" is a program that establishes a connection to a server for the purpose of sending one or more HTTP requests. An HTTP "server" is a program that accepts connections in order to service HTTP requests by sending HTTP responses. JG: I don’t see how using HTTP as a EPP transport would be considered uncompliant with RFC7230. Below is the flow of using HTTP as an EPP transport: 1. Establish TCP connection 2. Establish TLS session via TLS-handshake 3. Establish HTTP session via setup of the HTTP session cookie (e.g., JSESSIONID) 4. Return EPP Greeting in framed HTTP response with the session cookie (e.g., JSESSIONID) 5. Support HTTP requests in the form of framed EPP commands that are returned in HTTP responses in the form of framed EPP responses. 6. EPP session ends that drops the connection (HTTP / TLS / TCP) [ML] I apologize James but I still don't understand how it would be possible to return an HTTP response including the EPP Greeting and establish a session cookie without having previously received an HTTP request or, to say it better, how it would be possible at the abstraction level provided by all the libraries and frameworks supporting HTTP communication on both client and server side. Being HTTP used as a purely transport (L4) protocol but not as a request/response (L7) protocol, the implementation wouldn't be compliant with RFC7230. The same concept is also repeated in Section 2.1 of RFC 2818 "HTTP over TLS": The agent acting as the HTTP client should also act as the TLS client. It should initiate a connection to the server on the appropriate port and then send the TLS ClientHello to begin the TLS handshake. When the TLS handshake has finished. The client may then initiate the first HTTP request. All HTTP data MUST be sent as TLS "application data". Normal HTTP behavior, including retained connections should be followed. JG: The first step is a HTTP GET request that establishes the HTTP session and receives the EPP Greeting in the HTTP GET response, which includes the HTTP session cookie. Subsequent requests can use a HTTP POST for the EPP command and receive the HTTPS POST response for the EPP response. The EPP SDK Stub Server supported use of either the HTTP GET or POST and if a HTTP session did not exist, it returned the EPP Greeting in the HTTP response with the HTTP session cookie. After the HTTP session was established, the responsibility of the HTTP layer was strictly to accept HTTP requests, which works as the packet framing of TCP, and places the EPP responses in the HTTP responses. The HTTP request and response is fully compliance with the RFCs, since the connection is a request with a greeting response, and subsequent EPP command and responses are handled in HTTP requests and responses. Connection state is maintained in the HTTP session, which would deal with issues like a failed login threshold and timeouts (idle and command). The Verisign EPP SDK includes an packet assembler class, which is configurable, which deals with the marshaling and unmarshaling of the commands and responses of the underlying EPP transport, which included assemblers for TCP, TLS, HTTP, and HTTPS. You could even setup client session pools using the assembler of your choice, where a single client could interface with an EPP/TLS server and an EPP/HTTPS server, all by specifying the desired EPP transport. If you are to mix the EPP protocol with the underlying transport layer, then it would remove the ability to plug in the desired transport. [ML] Now everything is clear to me. I didn't udenstrand your previous message because you omitted that a client starts the HTTP session via HTTP GET :-) Both .it and .pl implement only the POST method. HTTP and EPP sessions are started together and linked each other after a Login command due to the following reasons: 1. The session ID is the unique key to retrieve EPP session information JG: That intermingles the application layer with the transport. Do you support EPP / TLS in parallel with EPP / HTTPS? If so, this intermingling would pose an issue. The EPP session id should be independent of the HTTPS session id. [ML] If I'm sure to generate every time a unique session ID, it doesn't matter if I support EPP/TLS together with EPP/HTTPS or not. It will be unique anyway. Don't understand why I should generate two unique session IDs, one to be used as session cookie and one to be used as EPP session identifier and then link them together ?! 2) Except for the client IP address, the information that a server must maintain as long as an EPP session lives is included in the Login request (i.e. the registrar name and the XML namespaces) 3) It's very unlikely that an EPP client doesn't know the services provided by a given EPP server JG: Does this mean that .it and .pl doesn’t provide the EPP Greeting when the connection is established? Returning the EPP Greeting at the time of connection is a requirement in RFC 5730 “An EPP server MUST respond to client-initiated communication (which can be either a lower-layer connection request or an EPP service discovery message) by returning a greeting to a client.”. [ML] Since RFC5730 states that Greeting can be returned in response to an Hello either, we are compliant. JG – I don’t agree that not returning the EPP Greeting upon the initial connection is compliant with RFC 5730 “An EPP server MUST respond to client-initiated communication (which can be either a lower-layer connection request or an EPP service discovery message) by returning a greeting to a client.”. By not supporting the EPP Greeting upon the initial connection, I believe it’s a violation of RFC 5730 and needs to be supported in a supported transport for EPP. 4) As a consequence of point 2 and 3, why should a client submit a meaningless HTTP request to the server before submitting the Login command to start an EPP session? JG: The EPP transport needs to support what is defined in RFC 5730. The connection is established and the server returns an EPP Greeting. [ML] The HTTP connection might be established at any HTTP request the EPP client sends to the EPP server. If the interval between two subsequent HTTP requests exceeds the Keep-Alive timeout set b the HTTP server, the HTTP connection is established again. The session cookie is the mechanism that allows an HTTP-based EPP server to trace all the HTTP requests back to an EPP session. An HTTP-based EPP server is able to manage requests, responses and sessions. It cannot manage connections because they are managed automatically at a lower layer. JG – The HTTP session id is setup upon the first request (GET or POST) when it does not exist. The code in the Verisign EPP SDK looks for the session cookie and if it doesn’t already exists set it. This means that once the connection is established, the HTTP session is setup and the EPP Greeting is returned. I don’t see the point in not setting up the HTTP session id upon the initial connection. 5) RFC5730 states that an EPP session starts with a <Login> command and RFC6265 states that servers maintain stateful sessions over HTTP by setting the session cookie. Hence, It seems natural to me that servers start an HTTP session and set the session ID after a successful Login command. JG: The EPP session may start with the login command, but the transport session is established ahead of the EPP session being established. [ML] In HTTP, a physical transport session doesn't exist. The stateful session is simulated via the session cookie over single HTTP connections. If the Keep-Alive is on, a TCP connection can be reused to issue multiple HTTP requests. JG – HTTP is being defined as the transport for EPP in the draft, so the first step is to ensure that the HTTP session is setup so that the EPP application protocol can ride on top of it. But this is not guaranteed. 6) Application protocol sessions on server side normally start after authenticating the client (please note that this is exactly what we are pursuing in RDAP) JG: You really need to follow the flow defined in RFC 5730 for an EPP transport. My recommendation again is to set the HTTP session id at the time of the connection and have the server return the EPP Greeting, just like what occurs with EPP over TLS. The transport should not intermingle with the application protocol, which enables the pluggable of transports on the client-side and the server-side. 7) It seems inefficient to release an HTTP session from an EPP session because it can result in wasting resources to maintain possible useless HTTP sessions. JG: I don’t see the wasting resource use case here. When a client makes an EPP over HTTPS connection to the server, the HTTP session is established and EPP rides on top of it. The first EPP packet sent is the EPP Greeting by the server. The server can establish policies such as maximum failed login attempts to drop the connection. [ML] So could a client send tons of HTTP GET without being blocked? JG – The network layer can limit the number of concurrent connections when using either HTTP or TCP as the EPP transport. 8) If an HTTP session is not established after an authentication, IP whitelisting is a must instead of a recommendation. Even if in general registries require registrars to declare their own clients' IP addresses out-of-band, this is not an absolute constraint and the same IP address might be used by multiple registrars. For the same reason, you cannot limit the number of HTTP sessions per registrar thus mitigating the risks pointed out in point 7. JG: IP whilelisting can be aggregated in the ACL and then checked during the login command. [ML] See my previous comment. Regarding to the EPP commands, other than Hello and Login, that don't include a valid session ID, think it's better the server returns an EPP error ("Command use error") instead of a Greeting response including a new session ID. JG: If you’re not returning the EPP Greeting at the time of the connection, you’re not implementing EPP. The definition of an EPP transport needs to fully support the EPP protocol defined in RFC 5730. [ML] This is exactly what happens also in your implementation. An HTTP connection can be established by issuing an HTTP GET but it might happen that a new one is established by issuing the subsequent POST for the Login command. In the first case, your server returns a Greeting response while in the second your server retuns the Login response. In both cases, a new HTTP connection is created. Even if you set the EPP session timeout equals to the Keep-Alive timeout, you can be sure that two subsequent requests are using the same HTTP connection. You can realize that if you control the HTTP connections but these means that you are working at a programming level that doesn't correspond to that provided by libraries and frameworks supporting HTTP on both client and server side. My personal opinion is that such an interpretation of EPP over HTTP is actually impractical. Have a question: how do you figure out the case where a client issues two Login commands with the same valid session ID previously received via the GET response? I imagine that only one would be accepted. If so, the mapping between an HTTP session and EPP session exists also in your implementation. It occurs when the EPP session is created instead of when the HTTP session is created. JG: The HTTP session maps to the state held on the server-side, which would include items like the client IP address, client certificate, and other attributes that can be used along with the passed user name and password in the login command. The EPP HTTP transport should handle the same features as EPP TCP in RFC 5734, which includes the connection requirements (e.g., TLS) and the method of packet framing. In the case of HTTP, there is the need for establishing the HTTP Session Id and using the HTTP request and response packets for containing / framing the EPP packets. [ML] Why should a client certificate be stored in the EPP session? JG – The client certificate can be gathered at the time of the connection, based on the TLS handshake. It can be used along with the client IP address as a second factor in the login command. The connection is established, the HTTP session is established, and the client IP address and the client certificate is stored in the HTTP session for a subsequent call to the login command, which includes the login name and password. By establishing the HTTP session at the time of the session and storing the client IP address and the client certificate in the HTTP session, the subsequent HTTP request containing the EPP login command is routed to the same server with the HTTP session to support multifactor authentication. Best Mario Best, Mario 7. Anyway, the approach normally followed by every HTTP implementer leverages the services provided by an application server that incorporates an HTTP server. You don't need to manage HTTP connections, HTTP resquest/response marhsalling/unmarshalling and other low-level details. You just need to focus on the core of your server. Similarly, on the other side side, after having configured an HTTP client instance, a client simply builds and sends an HTTP request, and then receives and processes an HTTP response. JG: An EPP client or server should be capable of reusing all the same command and response processing without dealing with transport specific logic. The transport layer can be built as a layer that is pluggable. A client can configure the transport to use on a per-server basis, and the server can reuse the same command processing logic whether running on top of TLS or HTTPS, since TLS and HTTPS are purely transports. [ML] It's unclear to me how two communications working at different layers could be handled in the same way. As I wrote in my previous reply to Matthias, the approach proposed aims to preserve EPP commands semantics so that the EPP server core should be the same regardless the fact that it is supported by HTTP or TCP. JG: It's very straight forward to make the EPP transport pluggable if you treat the EPP transport as purely a transport. The application layer does need to go through a pluggable transport layer to enable the transport layer to frame, and marshal/unmarshal the commands and responses. In the case of the Verisign EPP SDK, that assembler layer took care of it for TCP, TLS, HTTP, and HTTPS. The EPP command processing is not dependent on the transport layer, meaning the EPP command processing layer doesn’t need to be concerned with setting a HTTP session cookie upon a successful EPP Login or handling the EPP Hello in any special way as it relates to HTTP cookies. EPP is a stateful protocol, where the underlying transport needs to support being stateful. If the desire was to move towards stateless, then you’re not defining an EPP transport but a new EPP protocol. My recommendation is to keep the EPP over HTTP simple and establish the HTTP cookie at the setup of the HTTP connection and separate the EPP sessions from the HTTP session. Mario If there is a HTTP transport for EPP, then it should be purely a transport and not intermingle with the application protocol. There is no need to directly tie a HTTP session with the established EPP session. By keeping them separate, it makes it much easier for the client and the server to have pluggable transports, where the processing of the EPP commands including the hello, login, and logout treat the transport as simply a connection with no intermingling of session management. If it means that you have to reimplement what has commonly been used for years, it isn't clear to me how it could be much easier. On the contrary, it seems to me much trickier, especially if you implement EPP-over-HTTP from scratch. If the goal is using the same approach for mapping every transport layer without considering the peculiarites of each transport protocol and the technology the implementers are accostumed to use to deal with them, it doesn't make sense to me. For example, I cannot figure out how HTTP load balancing could support your solution. JG: The HTTP transport for EPP can easily be defined as a pure transport, which provides a connection for the application layer to leverage in the same fashion as TLS. The load balancer can leverage the TLS session id to route to the EPP gateway and in the case of HTTP, the HTTP session can be used to route the request to the appropriate application server that contains the connection state. Some HTTP application server proxies leverage the HTTP session to route the requests to the application server that contains the HTTP session and state. You need to establish the HTTP session when the connection is established to support the needed routing. There are other load balancing options, but by simplifying EPP over HTTP to have HTTP as purely a transport, it provides maximum flexibility in routing and maximum pluggability of transports (TCP, TLS, HTTP, HTTPS). Best, Mario -- JG [cid:image005.png@01D84450.DDD4E8A0] James Gould Fellow Engineer jgould@Verisign.com<applewebdata://13890C55-AAE8-4BF3-A6CE-B4BA42740803/jgould@Verisign.com> 703-948-3271 12061 Bluemont Way Reston, VA 20190 Verisign.com<http://secure-web.cisco.com/1ojxKstUEceETR7pe4khQ2dcwgGUwoOuZu4vhcT-TZcTCCpM93jXl6eq5i46tfTPt6lE9M6FO7hPqFZQVgxN5su1ozpEIXrOmp6SzB5kEB5SXCcRaJIg-vRb2B_SxGeDcgjxTqmZNEVO_Z0LtwZEFTLbzsLhmMMT-MlZ9pX7rpBY6Q8K0RxXyklhUEXCOqlJ0RMcZX2tEZNHp0Pr6XFhgw4X7OA0XCs0tk_jqiJbYMrkAFF0PXiAItfCmm_MR8whC/http%3A%2F%2Fverisigninc.com%2F> From: regext <regext-bounces@ietf.org><mailto:regext-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Mario Loffredo <mario.loffredo@iit.cnr.it><mailto:mario.loffredo@iit.cnr.it> Date: Friday, March 25, 2022 at 11:01 AM To: "regext@ietf.org"<mailto:regext@ietf.org> <regext@ietf.org><mailto:regext@ietf.org> Subject: [EXTERNAL] [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-over-http Hi folks, here are in the following some comments grouped by subject to last meeting's feedback about EPP-over-HTTP: 1) Draft title Ulrich suggested to call the document EPP-over-HTTPS. I replied that the name was assigned to be consistent with RFC5734, i.e. EPP-over-TCP. SImilarly to RFC5734, the draft states, first in the abstract and then in the security considerations, that TLS is required. That being said, the authors don't object to renaming the dcocument EPP-over-HTTPS if the WG agrees. 2) Cookies Jim (Reed) asked why cookies should be used in this case. The reasons why we have used session cookiea are that they represent a standard method (RFC6265), well known to the community of REST service implementers, largely used and natively supported by libraries and frameworks on both client and server side. For example, it is the same method used by rdap-openid to map an RDAP session and tie it to an access token :-) .it and .pl have been using this method since the beginning and the registrars, after being informed that they had to enable cookies in their HTTP clients, have no longer complained about cookie management. In addition, the implementation of such a method doesn't introduce any change to the EPP core spec. Indeed, it preserves EPP comands semantics and doesn't mix the application layer with the transport layer. I would like to say that, regarding the clear distinction between those layers, this proposal is even better than RFC5734 as every EPP response is returned by the server as a consequence of receiving an EPP request. On the contrary, in RFC5734, an EPP <greeting> is returned to the client after the TCP connection has been established so, at least in this case, the two layers get mixed. Which method other than session cookie shoud be used instead ? 3) Security Considerations Ulirch recommended to review the security considerations by inheriting those from TLS WG about which versions and ciphers of TLS to use. Thanks a lot for the heads up, Ulrich. Surely, we'll do. Gavin noted that, unlike EPP-over-TCP, this draft states that client IP address check is optional. As a matter of fact, it is stated as recommended. Anyway, the authors don't object to changing it into an absolute rquirement if the WG agrees. 4) Cookie vs. HTTP Connection One comment from James in the chat is about establishing the cookie at setup of the connection and not linking it to the EPP Login command. James, can you further clarify why we should opt for establishing the cookie at setup of the connection and how shoudl it be possible? For example, what kind of request should be used to start the HTTP connection? IMO, an HTTP session is something that is inherently unlinked to the HTTP connections. HTTP connections can be broken but sessions don't get lost. Programmatically, REST implementers are in charge of processing HTTP requests and building responses rather than managing HTTP connections, which is instead delegated to the application servers. Finally, I would like to outline that Section 2.9.1 of RFC5730 states that an EPP session starts with a Login command and the mechanism described by RFC6265 lets (I'm quoting here) "the servers maintain a stateful session over the mostly stateless HTTP protocol". As a consequence, it seems much more practical to start the EPP/HTTP session as a result of a Login command. 5) EPP/HTTP Sessions vs. HTTP3 Connections Ulrich remarked that, in HTTP3, it is possible to have multiple sessions on an HTTP connection. This is valid also for the other HTTP versions. In fact, an HTTP connection can be kept alive and, over it, a client could submit multiple login-commands-logout sequences. This is quite usual for a smart client managing a pool of HTTP connections. Instead, It is unlikely but not impossible to come across HTTP connections supporting multiple concurrent sessions. What should be the possible drawbacks for a server in allowing the scenarios above? 6) Client authentication in HTTP3 Another note pointed out that HTTP3 client authentication requirements are different from this draft and they need to be reconciled. Think that it could be sufficient to add to the security considerations some text similar to what is included in section 4.4 "Peer authentication" of RFC 9001 "Using TLS to secure QUIC": A client MUST authenticate the identity of the server. This typically involves verification that the identity of the server is included in a certificate and that the certificate is issued by a trusted entity (see for example [RFC2818<https://secure-web.cisco.com/1tkPqD6aAMfTp6t6KppHDGdn0xpgOWSMeCqwZR-hs9Duph9SiceA0vCbaJJVqywNzcZscc6vUZkCPH9lCdtXq_nVJ3OfnNMz-XTQvhBuSBLsXa0VfO5ZNrGo47fSin8GRaQOWRSvSQP_7vRecBdddhF6L0Yqx3KcxAGpvdxpFCsPhLcd5bm-aVy3vTko6TfGBlohe2XEw3bwUmH-u56ZuZz50CUXUqA3YDFgBENAwPrLBjwdDxwgG1JFVGPZF_LEQ/https%3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc2818>])>]). The draft has only considered the optional use of a certificate on server side (not on client side). In doing that, the draft is consistent with another sentence in the same paragraph of RFC9001: A server MAY request that the client authenticate during the handshake. A server MAY refuse a connection if the client is unable to authenticate when requested. Would it address the feedback? That's all for now. Hope I did not miss anything. Thanks a lot for your interest and feedback. Looking forward to your further comments. Best, Mario -- Dr. Mario Loffredo Technological Unit “Digital Innovation” Institute of Informatics and Telematics (IIT) National Research Council (CNR) via G. Moruzzi 1, I-56124 PISA, Italy Phone: +39.0503153497 Web: http://www.iit.cnr.it/mario.loffredo<http://secure-web.cisco.com/1Af0lIvD4wj2TkngfEVwrFVEVRozLiVIU2m1Gi1AH1GN4-eWP-IREXsOLCh8OJ03YAxRNYqVCPHQSwgj-tMCyzvN3jokOBTIBx4-5n1pJdiRXxl-ShJCaHkCjGNPa8EA5qw4kPjkxIrFAy1qOTcPFhieqdc_xyu8yisYoXzily9ozVw3GZaUtkKrLnmnDJhlFv2LRTCTnw913LzH8bX-hB6FpPlyFi_0v2_H1NFCgZYjuu4pgUeOeIqQJRQwtzNLS/http%3A%2F%2Fwww.iit.cnr.it%2Fmario.loffredo> -- Dr. Mario Loffredo Technological Unit “Digital Innovation” Institute of Informatics and Telematics (IIT) National Research Council (CNR) via G. Moruzzi 1, I-56124 PISA, Italy Phone: +39.0503153497 Web: http://www.iit.cnr.it/mario.loffredo<http://secure-web.cisco.com/1OpUT5efcRPCKu9ZmpfyFmbeoIexTqMIlduFKl7VTUSeET1W3oogufCAfJPPw-WSQ0iyo_wkztY_7M69qw0yf13C4w7OWB_Zk5w2FsV-GGCSLot8lFQdslU0DvCpCTw9FjZr0AsFsubGH-kToYrLxzzEj7vGDKuxIFxPK92P5bu2CDOE4UFtRPRGvu9rzX83rks8X2le_j1uSS1SD5B8CyvSp0tsne0HWMS5luho_DIhdOil7-0a_7ZX6CQA08GQq/http%3A%2F%2Fwww.iit.cnr.it%2Fmario.loffredo> _______________________________________________ regext mailing list regext@ietf.org<mailto:regext@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/regext<https://secure-web.cisco.com/16jl36WEWq0s-czRNUY5mezogTB1s8eM6-POsf3osvBxTtShse2Gx3vayC92AUxQ8ebDwE9Ob8SzhMcrkTCHnZy_RbpQlkSPKyyG9v1LOvWmmr2bX-q2Kwz-52tKvzlBlfgMU_rKnCsIFS9e53n9Fl1sqideuhzE2Qvq05_MQ6tGzuKP1z0P4vYyDR8QmVl4xwlz-BKFhZLijpQYz9CLe61qg3JAC0a2ldUiZMLUwjnSSssMNXvvVibSRdv-9l9yg/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ietf.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fregext> -- Dr. Mario Loffredo Technological Unit “Digital Innovation” Institute of Informatics and Telematics (IIT) National Research Council (CNR) via G. Moruzzi 1, I-56124 PISA, Italy Phone: +39.0503153497 Web: http://www.iit.cnr.it/mario.loffredo<http://secure-web.cisco.com/1yKvefSSzzB1xtPf0Zt9UvXnOkA28n5LvF1HkMnNZqV6Dwz7x7ZD06GbmS94ZAQwsmSA6iszQPAkGi5fNCSMjCHwEbful0vNQc0bfu7a2ydpIkKyqCYgjHlBp7I_-3eCZXAtMTjU_xfTEae9EnXNbksctYNkGyOsHDR02jSoOeVLa3lgW8hWUZ20zgxxFQlt_HdsERDtOQY4EoiE3orLFHDV3wtSA-ChHIYVp1pfMvU2aCEBQ3tWEhFOLp740jUPP/http%3A%2F%2Fwww.iit.cnr.it%2Fmario.loffredo> -- Dr. Mario Loffredo Technological Unit “Digital Innovation” Institute of Informatics and Telematics (IIT) National Research Council (CNR) via G. Moruzzi 1, I-56124 PISA, Italy Phone: +39.0503153497 Web: http://www.iit.cnr.it/mario.loffredo<http://secure-web.cisco.com/1pp2UVbYq0m0PdgNAIf-MFBBPlI6rgwJb-nl0OyxKTaZvJklLUlXEVPn3qvn6ziLbUr86nSYHSn9PLRlT1wKKUgtGjJOdnJ8Ghkk3hlYjxMa4J4AaIOBZ7WvzWPIEvoHPBVb2TdHFIKvtiJkT5ev0nRTy-ErBgM9XRxiNe_p-wkwdeLKKqJWcyzpKSrlr3WZKQaTzmyHAwtIPMymiYesdU2YUhfSeGkOO4qysnLCFQpp6nqMFwr28xmvjE8p7Rz8v/http%3A%2F%2Fwww.iit.cnr.it%2Fmario.loffredo> _______________________________________________ regext mailing list regext@ietf.org<mailto:regext@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/regext<https://secure-web.cisco.com/1_yXrltn2RrdNqPaGnsV60e0pSnpG8AzTQaKHAHbw6tQQMN0n3KvNvk-k2czAi4aJNkNyi_TCbSql8OP19bk6mxSZ-wdw-2iLikdj4eoHyXrRLQ6AZ4Rbq4_BoJMLgvEo8RgkfTbr8vCOfDJUkZxDCg2k9Cw5hk6lyE4n7a08e61-x_2-sGZoXxxxBfsAiipo8fC6lwPln1Ub3I7GQm-M6cQvbO-I_pvCAJhp_XEp81GqKdUvURiK0DaIyddU_RiV/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ietf.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fregext> -- Dr. Mario Loffredo Technological Unit “Digital Innovation” Institute of Informatics and Telematics (IIT) National Research Council (CNR) via G. 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- [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-over-… Mario Loffredo
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Gould, James
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Mario Loffredo
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Matthias Pfeifer
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Mario Loffredo
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Gould, James
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Thomas Corte (TANGO support)
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Mario Loffredo
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Mario Loffredo
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Thomas Corte (TANGO support)
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Gould, James
- [regext] Fwd: Comments to the feedback about epp-… Matthias Pfeifer
- [regext] Fwd: Comments to the feedback about epp-… Mario Loffredo
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Alexander Mayrhofer
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Mario Loffredo
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Gould, James
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Mario Loffredo
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Gould, James
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Mario Loffredo
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Thomas Corte (TANGO support)
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Gould, James
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Mario Loffredo
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Patrick Mevzek
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Mario Loffredo
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Thomas Corte (TANGO support)
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Francisco Obispo
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Mario Loffredo
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Hollenbeck, Scott
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Mario Loffredo
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Francisco Obispo
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Mario Loffredo
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Hollenbeck, Scott
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Francisco Obispo
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Mario Loffredo
- Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-o… Thomas Corte (TANGO support)