Re: [regext] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-regext-login-security-07: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org> Thu, 23 January 2020 13:36 UTC
Return-Path: <rdd@cert.org>
X-Original-To: regext@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: regext@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9E6751200B9; Thu, 23 Jan 2020 05:36:02 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.998
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.998 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=cert.org
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id L_L9_Gtx8RIe; Thu, 23 Jan 2020 05:36:00 -0800 (PST)
Received: from taper.sei.cmu.edu (taper.sei.cmu.edu [147.72.252.16]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AD2E512004A; Thu, 23 Jan 2020 05:36:00 -0800 (PST)
Received: from korb.sei.cmu.edu (korb.sei.cmu.edu [10.64.21.30]) by taper.sei.cmu.edu (8.14.7/8.14.7) with ESMTP id 00NDZSUw031808; Thu, 23 Jan 2020 08:35:28 -0500
DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 taper.sei.cmu.edu 00NDZSUw031808
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=cert.org; s=yc2bmwvrj62m; t=1579786528; bh=3mo0Eb7MNdjWjQVrRc/9nL5LyqV7qdKdbjHRSGpfZEU=; h=From:To:CC:Subject:Date:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=Z1WA5Ac6xwXUcLiqtiLe6uNor2qQ8/PMMb+W42GytYV5Xx78Vsjh4HbT5UpNfkrRm M7RH3pEsTZLflo2f0eWbAdMydgt5SX6eu7n2RJfrAyeNbg0V5W1wDGfJ1UULwY+K6S q5lllUMBCfy+qUQ/ObqOewyO7wMB25kHop6WqQgc=
Received: from CASCADE.ad.sei.cmu.edu (cascade.ad.sei.cmu.edu [10.64.28.248]) by korb.sei.cmu.edu (8.14.7/8.14.7) with ESMTP id 00NDZLFq020084; Thu, 23 Jan 2020 08:35:21 -0500
Received: from MARCHAND.ad.sei.cmu.edu ([10.64.28.251]) by CASCADE.ad.sei.cmu.edu ([10.64.28.248]) with mapi id 14.03.0468.000; Thu, 23 Jan 2020 08:35:21 -0500
From: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
To: "Gould, James" <jgould=40verisign.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
CC: "draft-ietf-regext-login-security@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-regext-login-security@ietf.org>, Joseph Yee <jyee@afilias.info>, "regext@ietf.org" <regext@ietf.org>, "regext-chairs@ietf.org" <regext-chairs@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-regext-login-security-07: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
Thread-Index: AQHV0Uyup5BxOW9xaE6wZGqBlb6C06f3ismAgACzChA=
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2020 13:35:21 +0000
Message-ID: <359EC4B99E040048A7131E0F4E113AFC0216F0CB99@marchand>
References: <157971551947.12241.8926230433846451051.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <5939F80A-808F-45E8-B24A-0F38735A5D94@verisign.com>
In-Reply-To: <5939F80A-808F-45E8-B24A-0F38735A5D94@verisign.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
x-originating-ip: [10.64.22.6]
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_000_359EC4B99E040048A7131E0F4E113AFC0216F0CB99marchand_"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/regext/Q1ckCzRld5axH2O_fHUp9XTM8hw>
Subject: Re: [regext] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-regext-login-security-07: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
X-BeenThere: regext@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: Registration Protocols Extensions <regext.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/regext>, <mailto:regext-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/regext/>
List-Post: <mailto:regext@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:regext-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/regext>, <mailto:regext-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2020 13:36:03 -0000
Hi JG! Thanks for the quick response. See details inline … From: iesg <iesg-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Gould, James Sent: Wednesday, January 22, 2020 4:42 PM To: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>; The IESG <iesg@ietf.org> Cc: draft-ietf-regext-login-security@ietf.org; Joseph Yee <jyee@afilias.info>; regext@ietf.org; regext-chairs@ietf.org Subject: Re: Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-regext-login-security-07: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT) Roman, Thank you for your review and feedback. I include my comments embedded below. -- JG James Gould Distinguished Engineer jgould@Verisign.com<mailto:jgould@Verisign.com> <applewebdata://13890C55-AAE8-4BF3-A6CE-B4BA42740803/jgould@Verisign.com> 703-948-3271 12061 Bluemont Way Reston, VA 20190 Verisign.com <http://verisigninc.com/> On 1/22/20, 12:52 PM, "Roman Danyliw via Datatracker" <noreply@ietf.org<mailto:noreply@ietf.org>> wrote: Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-regext-login-security-07: Discuss When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-regext-login-security/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- DISCUSS: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ** Section 3.1. When @type=”stat” and the name of the stat is set in @name, how does a client know the semantics of this stat? Is that negotiated out of band? JG - The possible set of "stat" type security event "name" values can be discovered / negotiated out of band or in band via a separate policy EPP extension, such as draft-gould-regext-login-security-policy. [Roman] Understood. Can you include a sentence to that effect. ** Section 4.1. Per <loginSec:userAgent>, how are the clients supposed to generate the app, tech or os strings in a way that the server will understand? If this is out of scope, please just say so. JG - Yes, that is out of scope, but there is a concrete example available in the Verisign EPP SDK, which is referenced in section 7.1 of draft-ietf-regext-login-security. [Roman] Understood. Can you add a sentence to that effect here too. These would address my concerns. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- I support Alissa Cooper’s DISCUSS position. ** Section 3.1. Is a @value required when @type=”cipher” or @type=”tlsProtocol”? The examples in Section 4 show the use of @value. Also, what format should be used to express the cipher or tlsProtocol? JG – There is no normative language that requires the “value” for @type=”cipher” or @type=”tlsProtocol”. It is reasonable to expect an implementer to populate the “value” attribute based on: * the description of the “cipher” and “tlsProtocol” types with “Identifies…”; * the description of the “value” attribute with “Identifies the value that resulted in the login security event”; * the example EPP response where there is a set of login security events. JG – The format of the “cipher” or “tlsProtocol” is dependent on the server-side TLS library, where the server would return the “cipher” or “tlsProtocol” value provided by the TLS library upon a successful TLS handshake. The format is left free-form based on this dependency. [Roman] No problem. Thanks for the clarification. ** Section 3.1. Per the description of event@lang, please cite the language format as coming from Section 3.4.3[W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20041028] JG – Yes, I can add the reference to section 3.3.3[W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20041028] for the “lang” attribute. I believe that section 3.3.3 is the correct section. [Roman] Thanks. ** Section 4.1. Per the children of <loginSec:userAgent>, would supporting a more formal approach also be useful -- using SWID (ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015) or COSWID (draft-ietf-sacm-coswid)? JG – I’ll review SWID and COSWID, but I believe the <loginSec:userAgent> children currently meet the needs. [Roman] No problem. I wanted to ensure there was awareness of related work on an XML approach to what seemed like the same approach. ** Section 4.1. Per pw and newPW’s descriptions of “all internal continuous whitepaces … is replaced with a single #x20” – is this intentionally precluding a password with a double space? JG – The intention is to describe how the XML schema “token” type is handled. The XML schema “token” type is used in EPP RFC 5730, which draft-ietf-regext-login-security is extending to remove the 16 character constraint. There is no intention to implicitly or explicitly change the handling of whitespace from what is defined in EPP RFC5730. [Roman] I understand the thinking – just read it as a token type (which it would be anyway per the schema). Thanks for clarifying. ** Section 4.1. Per “If non-ASCII characters are supported with the plain text password, then use a standard for passwords with international characters, such as the OpaqueString PRECIS profile in [RFC8265].”, if non-ASCII characters are supported, how does a client know which approach to take with a given server in an interoperable. RFC8265 is a helpful reference but the current text seems to provide no guidance. JG – This language was added based on a discussion with the Area Director to address a concern raised on the mailing list. The server policy can be communicated out of band or in band using a policy extension such as draft-gould-regext-login-security-policy. [Roman] Understood. IMO, noting that this kind of policy should/could be communicated out of band would be a helpful clarification. ** Section 5. Please note in the Section 5 introduction that the blob between the BEGIN and END tags in Section 5.1 are formally specified by XML Schema. JG – I can add “XML” prior to each “schema” reference in the introduction of section 5. [Roman] Thanks. This is really a reference nit – if you use a formal language, just cite it. ** Section 8. Please note that the Security Considerations of RFC5730 apply and that this document enhances these security services. JG – I can add a leading sentence to section 8 stating that, “The Security Considerations of [RFC5730] apply in this document, and this document enhances these considerations.” [Roman] Thanks. Works for me. ** Editorial Nits -- Section 1. Typo. s/pssword/password/ JG – I believe the nit is s/pasword/password/ in section 1, which will be fixed. [Roman] Right – with some irony, that’s the typo I was referencing with my own typo. Thanks. Thanks, Roman
- [regext] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-re… Roman Danyliw via Datatracker
- Re: [regext] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-iet… Gould, James
- Re: [regext] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-iet… Roman Danyliw
- Re: [regext] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-iet… Gould, James
- Re: [regext] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-iet… Gould, James
- Re: [regext] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-iet… Alexey Melnikov