Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-over-http

["Gould, James" <[e-mail]>]

Mario,

For #4 “Cookie vs. HTTP Connection”, you asked the question “can you further clarify why we should opt for establishing the cookie at setup of the connection and how should it be possible? For example, what kind of request should be used to start the HTTP connection?”.

I implemented pluggable transports in the Verisign EPP SDK, which included HTTP, HTTPS, TCP, and TLS.  The Verisign EPP SDK does include a client interface as well as a server stub implementation, so I was able to see the transports from both sides.  Support for HTTP and HTTPS was removed once we stopped supporting EPP over HTTP.  The cookie is setup at the time of the HTTP or HTTPS connection.  There is no “request” that is used to start the HTTP connection, just like the case for TCP and TLS.  A network connection is made, which includes the underlying TLS handshake in the case of HTTPS and TLS and the cookie is setup for HTTP and HTTPS, and then the EPP application protocol rides on top of it.  If there is a HTTP transport for EPP, then it should be purely a transport and not intermingle with the application protocol.  There is no need to directly tie a HTTP session with the established EPP session.  By keeping them separate, it makes it much easier for the client and the server to have pluggable transports, where the processing of the EPP commands including the hello, login, and logout treat the transport as simply a connection with no intermingling of session management.

--

JG

[cid:[e-mail]48B0]

James Gould
Fellow Engineer
[e-mail]<applewebdata://13890C55-AAE8-4BF3-A6CE-B4BA42740803/[e-mail]>

703-948-3271
12061 Bluemont Way
Reston, VA 20190

Verisign.com<http://verisigninc.com/>

From: regext <[e-mail]> on behalf of Mario Loffredo <[e-mail]>
Date: Friday, March 25, 2022 at 11:01 AM
To: "[e-mail]" <[e-mail]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] [regext] Comments to the feedback about epp-over-http


Hi folks,

here are in the following some comments grouped by subject to last meeting's feedback about EPP-over-HTTP:



1) Draft title

Ulrich suggested to call the document EPP-over-HTTPS.

I replied that the name was assigned to be consistent with RFC5734, i.e. EPP-over-TCP.

SImilarly to RFC5734, the draft states, first in the abstract and then in the security considerations, that TLS is required.

That being said, the authors don't object to renaming the dcocument EPP-over-HTTPS if the WG agrees.



2)  Cookies

Jim (Reed) asked why cookies should be used in this case.

The reasons why we have used session cookiea are that they represent a standard method (RFC6265), well known to the community of REST service implementers, largely used and natively supported by libraries and frameworks on both client and server side. For example, it is the same method used by rdap-openid to map an RDAP session and tie it to an access token :-)

.it and .pl have been using this method since the beginning and the registrars, after being informed that they had to enable cookies in their HTTP clients, have no longer complained about cookie management.
In addition, the implementation of such a method doesn't  introduce any change to the EPP core spec. Indeed, it preserves EPP comands semantics and doesn't mix the application layer with the transport layer.

I would like to say that, regarding the clear distinction between those layers, this proposal is even better than RFC5734 as every EPP response is returned by the server as a consequence of receiving an EPP request.

On the contrary, in RFC5734, an EPP <greeting> is returned to the client after the TCP connection has been established so, at least in this case, the two layers get mixed.

Which method other than session cookie shoud be used instead ?



3)   Security Considerations

Ulirch recommended to review the security considerations by inheriting those from TLS WG about which versions and ciphers of TLS to use.

Thanks a lot for the heads up, Ulrich. Surely, we'll do.



Gavin noted that, unlike EPP-over-TCP, this draft states that client IP address check is optional.

As a matter of fact, it is stated as recommended.

Anyway, the authors don't object to changing it into an absolute rquirement if the WG agrees.



4)  Cookie vs. HTTP Connection

One comment from James in the chat is about establishing the cookie at setup of the connection and not linking it to the EPP Login command.
James, can you further clarify why we should opt for establishing the cookie at setup of the connection and how shoudl it be possible? For example, what kind of request should be used to start the HTTP connection?

IMO, an HTTP session is something that is inherently unlinked to the HTTP connections.

HTTP connections can be broken but sessions don't get lost.

Programmatically, REST implementers are in charge of processing HTTP requests and building responses rather than managing HTTP connections, which is instead delegated to the application servers.

Finally, I would like to outline that Section 2.9.1 of RFC5730 states that an EPP session starts with a Login command and the mechanism described by RFC6265 lets (I'm quoting here) "the servers maintain a stateful session over the mostly stateless HTTP protocol". As a consequence, it seems much more practical to start the EPP/HTTP session as a result of a Login command.



5) EPP/HTTP Sessions vs. HTTP3 Connections

Ulrich remarked that, in HTTP3, it is possible to have multiple sessions on an HTTP connection.

This is valid also for the other HTTP versions.

In fact, an HTTP connection can be kept alive and, over it, a client could submit multiple login-commands-logout sequences.

This is quite usual for a smart client managing a pool of HTTP connections.

Instead, It is unlikely but not impossible to come across HTTP connections supporting multiple concurrent sessions.

What should be the possible drawbacks for a server in allowing the scenarios above?



6) Client authentication in HTTP3

Another note pointed out that HTTP3 client authentication requirements are different from this draft and they need to be reconciled.

Think that it could be sufficient to add to the security considerations some text similar to what is included in section 4.4 "Peer authentication" of RFC 9001 "Using TLS to secure QUIC":

   A client MUST authenticate the identity of the server.  This

   typically involves verification that the identity of the server is

   included in a certificate and that the certificate is issued by a

   trusted entity (see for example [RFC2818<https://secure-web.cisco.com/1tkPqD6aAMfTp6t6KppHDGdn0xpgOWSMeCqwZR-hs9Duph9SiceA0vCbaJJVqywNzcZscc6vUZkCPH9lCdtXq_nVJ3OfnNMz-XTQvhBuSBLsXa0VfO5ZNrGo47fSin8GRaQOWRSvSQP_7vRecBdddhF6L0Yqx3KcxAGpvdxpFCsPhLcd5bm-aVy3vTko6TfGBlohe2XEw3bwUmH-u56ZuZz50CUXUqA3YDFgBENAwPrLBjwdDxwgG1JFVGPZF_LEQ/https%3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc2818>])>]).



The draft has only considered the optional use of a certificate on server side (not on client side). In doing that, the draft is consistent with another sentence in the same paragraph of RFC9001:

   A server MAY request that the client authenticate during the

   handshake.  A server MAY refuse a connection if the client is unable

   to authenticate when requested.





Would it address the feedback?





That's all for now.

Hope I did not miss anything.

Thanks a lot for your interest and feedback.

Looking forward to your further comments.

Best,

Mario



--

Dr. Mario Loffredo

Technological Unit “Digital Innovation”

Institute of Informatics and Telematics (IIT)

National Research Council (CNR)

via G. Moruzzi 1, I-56124 PISA, Italy

Phone: [phone]

Web: http://www.iit.cnr.it/mario.loffredo<http://secure-web.cisco.com/1Af0lIvD4wj2TkngfEVwrFVEVRozLiVIU2m1Gi1AH1GN4-eWP-IREXsOLCh8OJ03YAxRNYqVCPHQSwgj-tMCyzvN3jokOBTIBx4-5n1pJdiRXxl-ShJCaHkCjGNPa8EA5qw4kPjkxIrFAy1qOTcPFhieqdc_xyu8yisYoXzily9ozVw3GZaUtkKrLnmnDJhlFv2LRTCTnw913LzH8bX-hB6FpPlyFi_0v2_H1NFCgZYjuu4pgUeOeIqQJRQwtzNLS/http%3A%2F%2Fwww.iit.cnr.it%2Fmario.loffredo>