[rfc4082-update] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-moskowitz-ads-b-auth-00.txt

[Robert Moskowitz <[e-mail]>]

this work is for information to this list, as it uses TESLA in an 
interesting way.

Unlike the work for GNSS SBAS, I AM able to fit the TESLA MAC within 
each ADS-B message.  But the MAC is small.

I welcome your review.  I am really on Passover vacation, so I will have 
limited interaction until the 13th.

Please note that this ID is a mapping of the paper used presented to 
ICAO Trust Framework Panel.

Bob


-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: 	New Version Notification for draft-moskowitz-ads-b-auth-00.txt
Date: 	Mon, 30 Mar 2026 09:55:58 -0700
From: 	[e-mail]
To: 	Stuart W. Card <[e-mail]>, Mikaëla Ngamboé 
<[e-mail]>, José M. Fernandez 
<[e-mail]>, Adam Wiethuechter 
<[e-mail]>, Jose Fernandez 
<[e-mail]>, Mikaela Ngamboe 
<[e-mail]>, Robert Moskowitz 
<[e-mail]>, Stuart Card <[e-mail]>



A new version of Internet-Draft draft-moskowitz-ads-b-auth-00.txt has been
successfully submitted by Robert Moskowitz and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name: draft-moskowitz-ads-b-auth
Revision: 00
Title: ADS-B Authentication
Date: 2026-03-30
Group: Individual Submission
Pages: 42
URL: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-moskowitz-ads-b-auth-00.txt
Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-moskowitz-ads-b-auth/
HTML: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-moskowitz-ads-b-auth-00.html
HTMLized: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-moskowitz-ads-b-auth


Abstract:

The Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) is a
surveillance technology mandated in many airspaces. It is now widely
deployed but suffers a lack of security and privacy. From a security
point of view, it is relatively easy to spoof the ADS-B messages.
With the appropriate readily available hardware and software. From a
privacy point of view, all the messages contain the aircraft’s
assigned 24-bit ICAO address, which makes it easy to link to data
about the aircraft, in particular to know when a particular aircraft
has flown and where to. In addition, the main transmission medium
utilized for ADS-B, i.e. the 1090 MHz frequency used by Extended
Squitter (1090ES), is approaching saturation in some parts of the
world, resulting in packet loss in certain areas [RF_Usage].

This paper presents how to use the IETF TESLA protocol along with
X.509 certificates issued by ICAO member states for each aircraft to
authenticate all ADS-B messaging. It leverages the 8PSK phase
overlay (PO) scheme proposed in the Minimum Operational Performance
Standards (MOPS) for ADS-B (RTCA [DO-260C]), which enables 1090ES
ADS-B transmissions to convey three times more information, to
support the transmission of the extra security information required
by the authentication scheme. By doing so, the impact of
authentication on channel usage is negligible. Beyond message
authentication, this scheme proposed has two important additional
benefits: 1) the possibility to implement a Flight Authorization
scheme, allowing ATC and intercepting aircraft to not only
authenticate an aircraft but to verify that it is authorizes to
conduct that flight and 2) a methodology for adequately protecting
the privacy by assigning rotating 24-bit identifiers to designated
aircraft, while maintaining the possibility to (blindly) authenticate
their ADS-B transmissions.



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