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[Rift] RIFT fingerprint coverage

Bruno Rijsman <brunorijsman@gmail.com> Sun, 21 July 2019 09:35 UTC

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From: Bruno Rijsman <brunorijsman@gmail.com>
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Date: Sun, 21 Jul 2019 11:35:01 +0200
Cc: rift@ietf.org
To: Tony Przygienda <tonysietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: [Rift] RIFT fingerprint coverage
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Hi Tony and others,

I just noticed that the RIFT fingerprints do not cover the key-id nor the fingerprint-length nor the major-version.

This means that if an adversary changes the key-id, fingerprint-length, or major-version, it will not be detected by the fingerprint.

I cannot think of an immediate attack vector (maybe force a weaker algorithm by changing the key-id), but "it feels wrong".

I wonder whether we should expand the coverage of fingerprints slightly, as shown below?

Note that AFAIK in OSPF (for example) the digest does cover the key-id and auth-data-len.

Suggested change:

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1

      UDP Header:
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |           Source Port         |       RIFT destination port   |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |           UDP Length          |        UDP Checksum           |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

      Outer Security Envelope Header:
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |           RIFT MAGIC          |         Packet Number         |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |    Reserved   |  RIFT Major   | Outer Key ID  |    Outer      |
      |               |    Version    |               | Fingerprint   |
      |               |               |               |    Length     |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                                                               |
      ~  Outer Security Fingerprint covers all content starting       ~
      |  at the Reserved field in the Outer Security Envelope Header  |
      |                                                               |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      | Weak Nonce Local              | Weak Nonce Remote             |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |            Remaining TIE Lifetime (all 1s in case of LIE)     |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

      TIE Origin Security Envelope Header:
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                                               |  TIE Origin   |
      |              TIE Origin Key ID                |  Fingerprint  |
      |                                               |    Length     |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                                                               |
      ~  TIE Origin Security Fingerprint covers all content starting  ~
      |  at the TIE Origin Key ID field                               |
      |                                                               |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

      Serialized RIFT Model Object
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                                                               |
      ~                Serialized RIFT Model Object                   ~
      |                                                               |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

PS 1: I know that the rift-magic and packet-nr fields are left out of the fingerprint coverege on purpose, so I left it that way.

PS 2: I also updated the names have a clearer distinction between the two fingerprints.

— Bruno

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