Re: [Rift] Security review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-05 is now complete

Tony Przygienda <tonysietf@gmail.com> Wed, 08 May 2019 04:55 UTC

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From: Tony Przygienda <tonysietf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 07 May 2019 21:55:03 -0700
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To: Bruno Rijsman <brunorijsman@gmail.com>
Cc: rift@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Rift] Security review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-05 is now complete
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Thought about 2.10 further, had a cht with someone and the problem is that
if there is no inner key then the outer envelope doesn't protect AFAIS,
i.e. we'd loose link integrity on such TIEs completely. I don't think
that's an acceptable attack vector, loosening of security model. Further
thoughts welcome.

2.10 is a good optimization, given especially that the object is the
biggest part so flooding out we'll save tons of CPU when outer
envelope (lifetime) changes. Should we include that?
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