Re: Security hole in RIP-2

Jeffrey C Honig <jch@nr-tech.cit.cornell.edu> Thu, 04 February 1993 21:27 UTC

Message-Id: <9302042112.AA27309@mitchell.cit.cornell.edu>
To: ietf-rip@xylogics.com
Subject: Re: Security hole in RIP-2
In-Reply-To: Message from Gary Scott Malkin <gmalkin@xylogics.com> on Thu, 04 Feb 1993 10:26:12 -0500.<14005.199302041526@atlas.xylogics.com>
Organization: Information Technologies/Network Resources; Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
Date: Thu, 04 Feb 1993 16:12:20 -0500
Sender: ietf-archive-request@IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US
From: Jeffrey C Honig <jch@nr-tech.cit.cornell.edu>

> There are two solutions.  Ideally, the router has to be smart enough to
> answer a RIP-1 query with a RIP-1 response, which may not be easy for
> some implementations.  Otherwise, the documentation must clearly state
> that authentication is only secure when the routers are configured to
> accept only RIP-2 packets, so that the RIP-1 query would be discarded.

I'd be in favor of stating that a RIP-1 query should be answered with
a RIP-1 response or not at all.

Jeff

Security hole in RIP-2 Gary Scott Malkin
Re: Security hole in RIP-2 Noel Chiappa
Re: Security hole in RIP-2 Oliver Korfmacher
Re: Security hole in RIP-2 Jeffrey C Honig
Re: implementation detail Jeffrey C Honig
Re: minutes of RIPv2 meeting in Amsterdam Jeffrey C Honig
Re: Document updates Jeffrey C Honig
Re: Clarification of when authentication is used Jeffrey C Honig