Re: [Roll] [roll] #142 (applicability-home-building): Clarification of secure key distribution

"roll issue tracker" <trac+roll@trac.tools.ietf.org> Mon, 28 April 2014 19:54 UTC

Return-Path: <trac+roll@trac.tools.ietf.org>
X-Original-To: roll@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: roll@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5B70E1A6FB2 for <roll@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 28 Apr 2014 12:54:09 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.551
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.551 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.651] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id F646QN5Mnd9m for <roll@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 28 Apr 2014 12:54:07 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from grenache.tools.ietf.org (grenache.tools.ietf.org [IPv6:2a01:3f0:1:2::30]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 335B31A6FA8 for <roll@ietf.org>; Mon, 28 Apr 2014 12:54:05 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1]:40711 helo=grenache.tools.ietf.org ident=www-data) by grenache.tools.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from <trac+roll@trac.tools.ietf.org>) id 1WercT-0001t9-Fq; Mon, 28 Apr 2014 21:53:41 +0200
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
From: "roll issue tracker" <trac+roll@trac.tools.ietf.org>
X-Trac-Version: 0.12.3
Precedence: bulk
Auto-Submitted: auto-generated
X-Mailer: Trac 0.12.3, by Edgewall Software
To: draft-ietf-roll-applicability-home-building@tools.ietf.org, mariainesrobles@gmail.com
X-Trac-Project: roll
Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2014 19:53:40 -0000
X-URL: http://tools.ietf.org/wg/roll/
X-Trac-Ticket-URL: http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/roll/trac/ticket/142#comment:3
Message-ID: <086.eab0970d65446d845d23c37c5de8c68e@trac.tools.ietf.org>
References: <071.83a629a0f47b2e8cb70a862eb5b7f060@trac.tools.ietf.org>
X-Trac-Ticket-ID: 142
In-Reply-To: <071.83a629a0f47b2e8cb70a862eb5b7f060@trac.tools.ietf.org>
X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 127.0.0.1
X-SA-Exim-Rcpt-To: draft-ietf-roll-applicability-home-building@tools.ietf.org, mariainesrobles@gmail.com, roll@ietf.org
X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: trac+roll@trac.tools.ietf.org
X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on grenache.tools.ietf.org); SAEximRunCond expanded to false
Resent-To: abr@sdesigns.dk, consultancy@vanderstok.org, emmanuel.baccelli@inria.fr, robert.cragie@gridmerge.com
Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/roll/mH79hicxvzWIPAGs4VBxMwiNEhA
Cc: roll@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Roll] [roll] #142 (applicability-home-building): Clarification of secure key distribution
X-BeenThere: roll@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Reply-To: roll@ietf.org
List-Id: Routing Over Low power and Lossy networks <roll.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/roll>, <mailto:roll-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/roll/>
List-Post: <mailto:roll@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:roll-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/roll>, <mailto:roll-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2014 19:54:09 -0000

#142: Clarification of secure key distribution


Comment (by mariainesrobles@gmail.com):

 Robert Cragie comment - date: 04/23/2014

 <RCC>

 It may seem a moot point but it is not essential for the *delivery
 mechanism* to have replay protection. A key management scheme itself
 clearly has to be able to manage the lifetime of keys including deployment
 and retirement. Therefore, for example, a group key is always associated
 with a key index or sequence number, which is typically part of the
 payload of a secure key update. Therefore, if this were replayed, it would
 implicitly not work as the key index would clearly be for an old key. The
 main reason I say this is because key wrapping schemes (e.g. RFC3394)
 often do not build in replay protection and RFC3394 indeed states the
 following: "This key wrap algorithm needs to provide ample security to
 protect keys in the context of prudently designed key management
 architecture."

 Therefore, I would prefer to add a sentence to the same effect, just not
 to associate it with the delivery mechanism. So I would suggest something
 like:

 "Securely delivering a key means that the delivery mechanism MUST have
 data origin authentication, confidentiality and integrity protection. On
 reception of the delivered key, freshness of the delivered key MUST be
 ensured."

 </RCC>

 Catherine Meadows comment  - 04/24/2014

 <CM> I am fine with all of Robert’s comments.</CM>

-- 
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
 Reporter:                           |       Owner:  draft-ietf-roll-
  yvonneanne.pignolet@gmail.com      |  applicability-home-
     Type:  defect                   |  building@tools.ietf.org
 Priority:  minor                    |      Status:  new
Component:  applicability-home-      |   Milestone:
  building                           |     Version:
 Severity:  Active WG Document       |  Resolution:
 Keywords:                           |
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/roll/trac/ticket/142#comment:3>
roll <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/roll/>