Re: [RPSEC] BGP Security Requirements v08

What meaning a receiving AS might assign to a partially authenticated
piece of data is left up to that AS (keeping in the spirit of autonomy).

Certainly one can envision an attack which exposes the authenticated
origin info but which nefariously removes intervening hops to draw in
traffic improperly (e.g., to inspect, alter, or drop).

> >I believe that you are arguing whether solutions should be REQUIRED
> >to provide benefit when island hopping.  And Curtis is arguing that
> >they should, because otherwise incremental deployment will be very
> >very unattractive.
> >
> >The choices seem to boil down to MUST or SHOULD.
> 
> Or a MUST/SHOULD vs. MAY.

Right, based on the discussion thus far, I was leaning toward keeping
the idea in as a MAY.  One might argue that doing so is effectively the
same as leaving it out altogether, but the intention and information is
retained.  Beyond that, asserting it as a "MAY" explicitly blocks any
interpretation which ends in "... NOT".

Tony

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