Re: [RPSEC] BGP Security Requirements v08

At 4:00 PM -0400 7/18/07, Curtis Villamizar wrote:
>...
>For example, if the AS Path is A X Y Z and I trust my peer A but not X
>and Y, the ROA only tells me that its OK for Z to have originated this
>route and nothing about whether this could have legitimately passed
>through Y and Z.  An authentication would be Z signature, Y signing
>that, X signing that, and A passing along the signatures.  If 128
>bytes are used per signature that is 384 bytes.

We really ought not get into details on specific techniques, as Russ 
noted. For example, if one uses a fancy EEC signature scheme that 
allow signature aggregation, the total for the three signatures is 
about 128 bytes.  (See the PhD work by  Meiyuan Zhao at Dartmouth 2 
years ago.)

>OTOH if some OOB mechanism also addressed whether a peering might be
>legitimate, then requirements would be met.  So maybe its just that
>the current ROA scheme (or schema) is inadequate.

The ROA scheme has a specific purpose, i.e., allowing a resource 
holder to express an globally-verifiable authorization to originate a 
route to the holder's prefix(es). ROAs ought not be criticized for 
not doing something that they are not intended to do.

Steve

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