Re: [RPSEC] BGP Security Requirements v08

Curtis Villamizar <curtis@occnc.com> Fri, 20 July 2007 02:40 UTC

Return-path: <rpsec-bounces@ietf.org>
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (helo=stiedprmman1.va.neustar.com) by megatron.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1IBiPx-0007vi-OC; Thu, 19 Jul 2007 22:40:33 -0400
Received: from rpsec by megatron.ietf.org with local (Exim 4.43) id 1IBiPw-0007uE-Bb for rpsec-confirm+ok@megatron.ietf.org; Thu, 19 Jul 2007 22:40:32 -0400
Received: from [10.91.34.44] (helo=ietf-mx.ietf.org) by megatron.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1IBiPv-0007tb-W0 for rpsec@ietf.org; Thu, 19 Jul 2007 22:40:31 -0400
Received: from 69.37.59.172.adsl.snet.net ([69.37.59.172] helo=harbor.brookfield.occnc.com) by ietf-mx.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1IBiPu-0002Jv-HS for rpsec@ietf.org; Thu, 19 Jul 2007 22:40:31 -0400
Received: from harbor.brookfield.occnc.com (harbor.brookfield.occnc.com [69.37.59.172]) by harbor.brookfield.occnc.com (8.13.6/8.13.6) with ESMTP id l6K2f7w6055015; Thu, 19 Jul 2007 22:41:07 -0400 (EDT) (envelope-from curtis@harbor.brookfield.occnc.com)
Message-Id: <200707200241.l6K2f7w6055015@harbor.brookfield.occnc.com>
To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
From: Curtis Villamizar <curtis@occnc.com>
Subject: Re: [RPSEC] BGP Security Requirements v08
In-reply-to: Your message of "Thu, 19 Jul 2007 14:44:50 EDT." <p06240504c2c52a6ee09d@[128.89.89.71]>
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2007 22:41:07 -0400
X-Spam-Score: 1.7 (+)
X-Scan-Signature: 8b30eb7682a596edff707698f4a80f7d
Cc: rpsec@ietf.org, Russ White <riw@cisco.com>
X-BeenThere: rpsec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5
Precedence: list
Reply-To: curtis@occnc.com
List-Id: Routing Protocol Security Requirements <rpsec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rpsec>, <mailto:rpsec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www1.ietf.org/pipermail/rpsec>
List-Post: <mailto:rpsec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:rpsec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rpsec>, <mailto:rpsec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
Errors-To: rpsec-bounces@ietf.org

In message <p06240504c2c52a6ee09d@[128.89.89.71]>
Stephen Kent writes:
>  
> A common theme in your comments is "practial [sic] and deployable." 
> There's nothing wrong with those goals, although I would add "secure" 
> as well :-). The problem, of course, is getting agreement on what 
> constitutes practical, deployable, and secure.
>  
> Steve


Practical and deployable should be goals if we want to see something
deployed.

Secure where there is no portion of the path containing
non-participant AS should be a goal.

Providing indication of better confidence with certain semi-trusted
non-participant AS in the path should be a goal.

Regarding Russ' comments: OOB is not excluded but any OOB solution
must meet requirements regarding AS Path, not just origin AS.

Do we have agreement?

Curtis


ps - If you are talking about general DDoS attacks, providers knew
this was possible.  They would rather see Bill Gates hung for
providing the insecure OS that made DDoS bots so easy to implement.
The point was that not much can be done from the provider's standpoint
for DDoS to end sites.  Now if the Feds confiscated PCs involved in
attacks, spam, etc, sent the PCs back to the supplier to apply
patches, returned the PCs, and sent the bill for the investigation to
the OS vendor, we'd have the problems all solved.  :-) Users of free
or homegrown OS would have to apply patches themselved before bringing
computers online again.  [No chance of this happenning - just a dream.]


_______________________________________________
RPSEC mailing list
RPSEC@ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rpsec