RE: [RPSEC] BGP Security Requirements v08

"Barry Greene \(bgreene\)" <bgreene@cisco.com> Wed, 11 July 2007 14:09 UTC

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Subject: RE: [RPSEC] BGP Security Requirements v08
Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2007 07:06:44 -0700
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Thread-Topic: [RPSEC] BGP Security Requirements v08
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From: "Barry Greene \(bgreene\)" <bgreene@cisco.com>
To: "Joe Touch" <touch@ISI.EDU>, "Tony Tauber" <ttauber@1-4-5.net>
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> I didn't see any changes related to the feedback I posted on 
> the transport protocol issues and GTSM. There are a number of 
> current I-Ds in this space that are not discussed, and any 
> description that includes the need for keying (SHOULD) might 
> reconsider whether GTSM qualifies as relevant at all in this space.

I see a tool - GTSM - that allows me to policy check the packet in
the forwarding ASIC - before I punt to the control plane of the
device - as totally relevant. It is a working tool which add
resistance to DOS. 

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