Re: [RPSEC] BGP Security Requirements v08

Curtis Villamizar wrote:
> In message <p06240528c2baa0b1241a@[128.89.89.71]>
> Stephen Kent writes:
>
>>> This is a pretty traditional and standard argument in routing protocol
>>> circles whenever extensions to a routing protocol are proposed--do we
>>> make it so older routers can at least forward the new information, or do
>>> we make it so it won't work in the presence of older routers? IMHO, it
>>> generally comes down to--is the information useful to routers on the
>>> other side of the nonsupporting router?
>>  
>> I agree that it is generally useful to have a router forward data 
>> that it can't use itself, but that a later router might be able to 
>> use.  However, I am not comfortable with a suggestion that if a 
>> solution cannot always guarantee this capability, that it is an 
>> unacceptable solution.
> 
> I think most of the WG is comfortable with this and is insisting on
> it.  How many times do we need to go in circles on this?  Once every
> IETF meeting?

Curtis, Stephen, please correct me if I'm mis-characterising your
opinions...

Curtis, you seem to be saying that passing on the information via
non-supporting routers is better than nothing, and so should definitely
be done.

Stephen, you appear to be saying that it might be found to be pointless
or, in fact, worse than useless (ie, actively harmful), and don't want
to be committed to doing so this early in the game.

Is that correct?

Rob

-- 
Robert Loomans                                 Email:  robertl@apnic.net
Senior Programmer/Analyst, APNIC               Phone:    +61 7 3858 3100
http://www.apnic.net                             Fax:    +61 7 3858 3199

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