[RPSEC] Charter and Meeting Agenda

Russ White <riw@cisco.com> Sat, 06 January 2007 14:37 UTC

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Date: Sat, 06 Jan 2007 09:37:19 -0500
From: Russ White <riw@cisco.com>
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Y'all:

The list has been pretty much down for a while, but we need to bring it
back up again. :-)

For the next IETF, we should probably meet, and go over:

o A new charter. Ours is woefully out of date, and while I've sent
several out, I've not received any response to base sending one to the
IESG on.

o Outstanding drafts.

Towards that end, please take a look at the proposed charter, below.
Anyone who has drafts they would like to present before the Prague
meeting, please let Tony or I know.

Also, anyone who has an outstanding draft, please let me know the
current status, so we can get things updated, and rolling again.

Thanks!

:-)

Russ

==

Proposed Charter:

The lack of a common set of security requirements and methods for
routing protocols has resulted in a wide variety of security
mechanisms for individual routing protocols. Ongoing work on
requirements for the next generation routing system and future work on
the actual mechanisms for it will require well documented routing
security requirements.

The products of this working group will be used by routing protocol
designers to ensure adequate coverage of security in the future,
including well known and possible threats.

The scope of work is limited to router-to-router protocols for unicast
and multicast systems, and does NOT include host-to-router protocol
such as IGMP, ICMP, ARP, or ND. It is also a non-goal at this point to
produce new or change the current security mechanisms in the existing
routing protocols.

The RPSEC working group is charged with the following tasks:

- - Document threat models for routing systems

- - Document security requirements for routing systems

- - Document security analysis and requirements for specific routing
  protocols (e.g., OSPF, BGP)

- - Provide a common area for discussion between security and routing
  experts on the topic of securing the routing system

Goals and Milestones:

July 07 Submit BGP Attack-Tree analysis for publication as
Informational RFC.

July 07 Submit OSPF vulnerability analysis for publication as
Informational RFC.

July 07 Submit BGP security requirements for publication as
Informational RFC.

July 07 Initial draft of requirements for point-to-point security of
BGP peering sessions.

December 07 Evaluate progress, recharter with new goals or shutdown.

==

Current Drafts:

o BGP Attack Tree: I believe, at least check, no-one was working on this
one. The original authors have, I think, all moved on, and I don't know
if anyone has the original text. We probably need a volunteer to edit
this draft through the final stages, which would mostly mean getting it
into a publishable format from the last known copy. It has, AFAIK,
already been accepted as a WG doc.

o OSPF Vulnerability Analysis: I think this was also accepted as a WG
doc, but I'm not certain of the current state.

o BGP Security Requirements: I thought we had a rough consensus on the
current text, so we should move this forward.

o P-2-P security requirements for BGP: This was to provide some cover
and thinking on the various TCP auth mechanisms to replace MD5 that are
currently being considered. We need, I believe, a volunteer to
author/edit this, and get it moving.

- --
riw@cisco.com CCIE <>< Grace Alone

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