Re: [RPSEC] BGP Security Requirements v08

> My comment was:  One might interpret this to mean that any extended 
> form of UDATE message MUST be transmitted through ASes that are not
> capable of processing it. This is imposing an unnecessary burden on
> solutions, since an alternative is to just mot send such messages
> through ASes than can't make use of them.

This is a question about use of security information during initial
deployment.  If there are islands of deployment that must communicate
through seas of non-deployment, is it useful for the deployer to
learn that there is a protected route island out there?  When the
information came to them over an unprotected sea?

I'd say that there is a potential for benefit.  Perhaps the unprotected
sea in between is known by other out-of-band means to be reliable,
even if clueless about the new protection mechanisms.  There might
be operational procedures that protect the intermediate sea that
are adequate from the point of view of the recipient on the island.

So I'd say that passing the info along is potentially beneficial,
to some, and should be passed.  The cost to the clueless routers
is storage and bandwidth - processing cost should be minimal.

--Sandy

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