Re: [RPSEC] [secdir] [sidr] Authentication for OSPFv3

Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu> Wed, 01 October 2008 15:57 UTC

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From: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
To: Vishwas Manral <vishwas.ietf@gmail.com>
References: <48D96507.4000207@sri.com> <20080929200231.3E5DD3F443@pecan.tislabs.com> <77ead0ec0809291853t63940339xc826b13cf5515176@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2008 07:00:27 -0400
In-Reply-To: <77ead0ec0809291853t63940339xc826b13cf5515176@mail.gmail.com> (Vishwas Manral's message of "Tue, 30 Sep 2008 07:23:24 +0530")
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Cc: msec@ietf.org, tsvwg@ietf.org, edward.jankiewicz@sri.com, ospf@ietf.org, secdir@MIT.EDU, sidr@ietf.org, rpsec@ietf.org, dward@cisco.com, Sandy Murphy <sandy@tislabs.com>, rcallon@juniper.net
Subject: Re: [RPSEC] [secdir] [sidr] Authentication for OSPFv3
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>>>>> "Vishwas" == Vishwas Manral <vishwas.ietf@gmail.com> writes:

    Vishwas> We can also solve the problem similarly by something like
    Vishwas> BTNS(ofcourse Multicast part needs to be thought further)
    Vishwas> which does not necessarily require any certificate
    Vishwas> verification - so we may have unauthenticated IKE SA's
    Vishwas> but then all keys for the CHILD_SA from there are
    Vishwas> automatically generated.


Let me see if I understand this approach correctly.  I want to
interact with OSPF.  Somehow there is a group key that is in use on my
link.  In order to obtain this key, I exchange in an unauthenticated
BTNS-style exchange with someone, and as a result of that exchange,
obtain the key?

First, who do I perform this exchange with?  Anyone who currently holds the key?

Second, what threats does this protect against?

Finally, one of the things we typically desire from BTNS-style
protocols is a way to turn them into higher-infrastructure protocols when the infrastructure is available.  Can I do that with your approach?  How?

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