Re: [RPSEC] BGP Security Requirements v08

>...
>  > 
>>  I do not think that you are saying that solutions COULD NOT provide
>>  benefit when island hopping.  The work being done in the sidr wg
>>  (to provide an infrastructure that would provide authorization for
>>  prefix origination) would be an example of protections that would
>>  still provide benefit when island hopping, as the origin authorization
>  > check is of value no matter how many clueless ASs touch the UPDATE.

The ROA defined by the SIDR work is a good example of a first step 
that acknowledges that some verified info is better than none, a 
point you have been making. It also is an example of a mechanism that 
addresses what some folks say is the most common form of accidental 
"attack" by ISPs, i.e., erroneous origin announcements due to config 
errors. That makes is an appropriate partial solution, since it 
addresses, in a comprehensive fashion, one specific form of problem. 
Also, the ROA model is especially simple, as there is no notion of a 
serial mix of verified and unverified path data, since a ROA attests 
only to origin AS data. Finally, based on the current SIDR 
architecture model, ROAs are  distributed via a repository system, 
essentially out-of-band, and so the argument re transitive 
propagation does not apply here.

>  > I believe that you are arguing whether solutions should be REQUIRED
>  > to provide benefit when island hopping.  And Curtis is arguing that
>>  they should, because otherwise incremental deployment will be very
>  > very unattractive.
>>
>  > The choices seem to boil down to MUST or SHOULD.

Sandy changed her position to MAY yesterday, based on further 
discussion and on Tony's suggestion.

Steve

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