Re: [RPSEC] BGP Security Requirements v08

At 12:14 PM -0400 7/18/07, Curtis Villamizar wrote:
>In message <F1A1D21DA394814E824AC89F5A005BA312CCE59D@zcarhxm0.corp.nortel.com>
>"James Ko" writes:
>> 
>> 
>>  Indeed, ideally incoming data should be "authentic" and "verifiable",
>>  otherwise we are back to square one and this work is no different but to
>>  give bad guys a window of opportunity to run man-in-the-middle attacks,
>>  or inject bogus routes.
>
>
>So why does Internet routing work at all today?  Rhetorical question.
>
>It does work by the way.  Not always perfectly.
>
>Curtis
>
>
>ps - The answer is because the DOS would be short lived and very
>traceable (ie: not much damage and they'd get caught).  The reason for
>this is the bogus information would have to be injected from within an
>ISP and ISP security of their own infrastructure is reasonably good.

Curtis,

a few observations:
	- as I just noted in a prior response, DoS is not the only issue here.

	- the fact that routing does generally work today is not a 
good basis for deciding on security requirements.  If we turn back 
the clock a few years we could say that DDoS attacks never happen and 
thus one need not make provisions to deter such attacks.  As they say 
in the financial sector "performance data shown represents past 
performance and is no guarantee of future results" :-).

	- active attacks against BGP sessions are possible. not all 
BGP sessions make use of extant protection mechanisms like the TCP 
MD5 checksum, and among those that do there are reports of key 
management that leave s a lot ot be desired

Steve


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