Re: [rrg] Constraints due to the need for widespread voluntary adoption

Patrick Frejborg <pfrejborg@gmail.com> Thu, 03 December 2009 07:09 UTC

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Date: Thu, 03 Dec 2009 09:09:19 +0200
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From: Patrick Frejborg <pfrejborg@gmail.com>
To: Noel Chiappa <jnc@mercury.lcs.mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [rrg] Constraints due to the need for widespread voluntary adoption
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On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 4:07 PM, Noel Chiappa <jnc@mercury.lcs.mit.edu> wrote:
>    > From: Patrick Frejborg <pfrejborg@gmail.com>
>
>    > concern about having a mapping database for routing information
>
> How does the mapping database differ, in terms of being a operational 'weak
> point', from the DNS?
>
> (Note that this is an architectural discussion, not an engineering one, so I
> am assuming that at the future point in time we are talking about, both
> systems have been well engineered, i.e. they have 'good' security: so that
> DNSSEC will have been fully deployed, along with some similar-strength
> mechanism for the mapping database. Here in the real world, it's not clear
> which system will be well secured first; if good security is in the mapping
> system from the start, it might actually be secured first.)
>
Hi Noel,

I think I got the message - you are designing a new mapping database,
using experience and lessons learned from the DNS world and making the
new a more robust and secured one.
Architecturally analyzing the approach,  it would be more secure than
the current distribution of routing information.

A question, if I loose my primary ETR how fast is the mapping database
updated to switch the connections to the secondary ETR? Is the mapping
database based upon Dynamic DNS?

-- patte