Re: [rrg] Rebooting the RRG

heinerhummel@aol.com Wed, 05 February 2014 08:08 UTC

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Subject: Re: [rrg] Rebooting the RRG
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The user should be made aware that his equipment is about to send out data.
I have no problems if this were done in either case (national or international destination).


Look, a government is suit for not protecting its people for being spied out. This means there is a strong interest for such protection
but this also means, a state has to be empowered to effectively prevent what it is accused for.


This is not balkanization. People have created states/nations themselves for good reason. The existing permanent data fraud must not last forever.
Or do you think this is a special form of "freedom/liberty" ?


Heiner



-----Ursprüngliche Mitteilung----- 
Von: Scott Weeks <surfer@mauigateway.com>;
An: heinerhummel <heinerhummel@aol.com>;
Verschickt: Mi, 5 Feb 2014 2:52 am
Betreff: Re: [rrg] Rebooting the RRG



Wouldn't this lead to balkinization of the internet?

scott


--- heinerhummel@aol.com wrote:
From: heinerhummel@aol.com

With the current routing architecture and its complete absence of any 
WHERE-awareness there is no way to give back any country its sovereignty. 
With TARA that wouldn't be a problem: Each country would recognize "its" 
part of the internet (intra- and inter-domain portions alike) and could 
take action that within its borders packets were encrypted according to 
its own keys. Packets which are being sent to outside of the country would 
be recognized as such ones and the user might be questioned to confirm 
whether forwarding should be done or not - just like he is reminded  to 
add a subject line if missing.