Re: [rtcweb] URI schemes for TURN and STUN

"Martin J. Dürst" <duerst@it.aoyama.ac.jp> Mon, 31 October 2011 03:27 UTC

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Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2011 12:26:55 +0900
From: "\"Martin J. Dürst\"" <duerst@it.aoyama.ac.jp>
Organization: Aoyama Gakuin University
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To: Harald Alvestrand <harald@alvestrand.no>
References: <4EAC6BF4.2000604@alvestrand.no> <CALiegf=f4kFzyDLWK+Y5vbuCEJFXX590+VuZ4bbnHZnvX0CoBA@mail.gmail.com> <4EAC8AE0.3020307@acm.org> <4EACD558.1050003@alvestrand.no>
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Cc: Keith Moore <moore@cs.utk.edu>, Ned Freed <ned.freed@mrochek.com>, Behave WG <behave@ietf.org>, "rtcweb@ietf.org" <rtcweb@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [rtcweb] URI schemes for TURN and STUN
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For the http vs. https case, there is a very good answer from Roy 
Fielding at
http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/www-tag/2006Mar/0040.html

In essence, not distinguishing the two schemes would mean either 
additional roundtrips (assuming http is the more frequent one) or 
exposition of data on the network that was supposed to be private.

Regards,    Martin.

On 2011/10/30 13:40, Harald Alvestrand wrote:
> On 10/29/2011 04:23 PM, Marc Petit-Huguenin wrote:
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>> On 10/29/2011 03:36 PM, Iñaki Baz Castillo wrote:
>>> 2011/10/29 Harald Alvestrand<harald@alvestrand.no>:
>>>> - I do not think it's appropriate to use "turn" and "turns" for
>>>> indicating
>>>> transport. Polluting the URI namespace with more configuration
>>>> parameters in
>>>> the form of trailing "s" is a Bad Thing.
>>> But there should be some way to indicate that a TURN server listens in
>>> TLS, right?
>>>
>> We should continue this discussion in BEHAVE, but I would like to ask
>> the OP to
>> send a pointer on the RFC or discussion that says that using a
>> trailing "s" to
>> indicate security is a bad thing.
> I'll have to forward this question to the apps ADs of a few years ago
> about whether there's documentation for it. It does not seem to have
> been captured in an RFC that I can find; discussion was in the
> ~2000-2005 timeframe.
>
> The short version, from memory: Doing "s" locks you into one and exactly
> one security scheme, and prevents you from saying anything about the
> requisite parameters for that scheme, while using AUTH parameters such
> as POP or in-band negotiation such as IMAP are much more flexible
> approaches.
>
>
>> Thanks.
>>
>> - -- Marc Petit-Huguenin
>> Personal email: marc@petit-huguenin.org
>> Professional email: petithug@acm.org
>> Blog: http://blog.marc.petit-huguenin.org
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