IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [rtcweb] Security Architecture: IdP for RTP and RTCP

Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Sat, 12 July 2014 03:17 UTC

Return-Path: <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: rtcweb@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: rtcweb@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id ED7EA1A03A0 for <rtcweb@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 11 Jul 2014 20:17:31 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 3KoNp6ZTTJEH for <rtcweb@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 11 Jul 2014 20:17:30 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-we0-x234.google.com (mail-we0-x234.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:400c:c03::234]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CC2DA1A01BE for <rtcweb@ietf.org>; Fri, 11 Jul 2014 20:17:29 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-we0-f180.google.com with SMTP id k48so943613wev.11 for <rtcweb@ietf.org>; Fri, 11 Jul 2014 20:17:28 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=8SeEyM2HDcINghVRazltqKiORVYAaQ4NQd8u4WQtb/o=; b=UiPIDsWmnp+VojJJMajPCBCb52JmSys3cf3FvpS6aiRUBFFelVK/NyIxk9tA2VoPn1 MPwdQjz8qxrOChQLRwKrz1J9CwCUspn72OGOContiTYCL2pBuCd5J96rHJXun5YOrn5w vO+Ns7WGnfBoF10s8VYJtrsiPd9GeIJ49ebNLw4Z8yDTRnmrfmCbh54LPJFvQVGQ6Oi/ fntOwCYbngcJzNzsttw4M8lFr1hIqlzqTGReu+5PWIZ9PZ/Jxc+Ws5+II6+Osmwe72eP YlkHOxAbuTcNYphMyVpDdfXlOKbE2MT3KRUr9ohHHd/0SuuVcYt/3rorgVTUUNCDMqoD kOUQ==
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Received: by 10.194.219.70 with SMTP id pm6mr3637122wjc.53.1405135048361; Fri, 11 Jul 2014 20:17:28 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.194.21.69 with HTTP; Fri, 11 Jul 2014 20:17:28 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <CABkgnnWK_5nqDJQNPFrWddehrcDHhOtae-2g4zHMHUvwRVqgYw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAOW+2dsVZj56aVL5+79d6RSTZFLwjfWdm=rs7FPnvdWQZHAdfA@mail.gmail.com> <CABkgnnUEXCuOcG_p5BpZf8Wz2Y-Pq92XGpmEb5304-uTz9JNuA@mail.gmail.com> <CAOJ7v-0iDjSFuDY=c_1vXApRWo66pXe_Hra=SnhWRKca-xBCSA@mail.gmail.com> <CABkgnnUd85TAzhUkDgDDSQ5J8KsT4RNCE62TZm0O64tg-Kvj=w@mail.gmail.com> <CACsn0cke=sQeb7T6X0e+WVVCJWfV61tO0yMV4RE8EqbSYadf5w@mail.gmail.com> <CABkgnnWK_5nqDJQNPFrWddehrcDHhOtae-2g4zHMHUvwRVqgYw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2014 20:17:28 -0700
Message-ID: <CACsn0c==d=de8-hixt5oN+vzyaWjJjxz4zM27eupoVp11MooqQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rtcweb/2i3jUB91JBEf1G0KecDyW-1AfzM
Cc: "rtcweb@ietf.org" <rtcweb@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [rtcweb] Security Architecture: IdP for RTP and RTCP
X-BeenThere: rtcweb@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Real-Time Communication in WEB-browsers working group list <rtcweb.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/rtcweb>, <mailto:rtcweb-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/rtcweb/>
List-Post: <mailto:rtcweb@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:rtcweb-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rtcweb>, <mailto:rtcweb-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2014 03:17:32 -0000

On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 12:39 PM, Martin Thomson
<martin.thomson@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 11 July 2014 12:03, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
>> So break one hash from the set and win. Why not require all to match?
>
> That would prevent someone from ever adding a new hash function to the protocol.
>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-mmusic-fingerprint explains a
> little more, though I note that (with fresh eyes) Section 3 is pretty
> damned cryptic and needs to be rewritten.
Ah, the spec does say all must match if present. Relevant sentence
from 2 " An endpoint that validates
a session using  fingerprint attributes MUST report failure if any
hash that it checks
doesn't match."

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd


-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email