Re: [rtcweb] SDP Security Descriptions (RFC 4568) and RTCWeb

Matthew Kaufman <matthew@matthew.at> Fri, 26 April 2013 13:31 UTC

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Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2013 06:31:50 -0700
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Subject: Re: [rtcweb] SDP Security Descriptions (RFC 4568) and RTCWeb
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On 4/25/2013 10:54 PM, Randell Jesup wrote:
>
> That's always the problem with strong security...  It has to be 
> unobtrusive-but-functional in the "normal" cases to get widely used.  
> Green-field encryption can be fairly easily strong because of lack of 
> needing to interop.
>

Even that isn't true. See, for instance, Zooko's triangle [1]. Getting 
strong encryption with useful authentication that protects a naive user 
from evil applications and signaling services is very very hard, even if 
you ignore interop.

Matthew Kaufman

[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zooko's_triangle 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zooko%27s_triangle>