Re: [rtcweb] Comments on draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-06

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Sat, 22 February 2014 01:14 UTC

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Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2014 17:14:42 -0800
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
To: Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [rtcweb] Comments on draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-06
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On 21 February 2014 17:02, Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> Sorry for my apparent failure to understand here, but we're still dealing
> with
> traffic to which the parties consent, right?  That is, you're thinking of
> malicious
> JS that sends channels worth of nonsense to blast the network while
> something
> the user cares about happens? (Two-player flappy bird but with a terrabit of
> nonsense
> screaming in the background?)


Maybe Magnus is looking for the mechanism described in
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-mmusic-rtcweb-bw-consent-00,
which might allow for control below the limit that the congestion
control permits.  I basically abandoned this, because it's small
potatoes. It's trivial to revoke consent if you notice a misbehaving
peer and then you only have to wait until the consent timer runs out
on the sender.  30s.