Re: [rtcweb] Security Architecture: IdP for RTP and RTCP

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Tue, 08 July 2014 21:47 UTC

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Date: Tue, 08 Jul 2014 14:47:01 -0700
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
To: Bernard Aboba <bernard.aboba@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [rtcweb] Security Architecture: IdP for RTP and RTCP
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On 8 July 2014 14:33, Bernard Aboba <bernard.aboba@gmail.com> wrote:
> BTW, the "compare" operation is potentially non-trivial in the case of
> internationalized identities.  None of the specifications currently describe
> how the identities are to be normalized in preparation for the comparison,
> so I can imagine that some "fun" could be had there.

FWIW, the right hand side of identity is well defined:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-arch-10#section-5.6.5.4.1

The LHS is completely open to confusable glyphs and all sorts of
horrors.  I really want to avoid stringprep or whatever it's current
incarnation looks like, that's probably unavoidable long term.  For
now though, can we not pretend that the IdP knows what they are doing?