Re: [rtcweb] Security Architecture: IdP for RTP and RTCP

Emil Ivov <emcho@jitsi.org> Wed, 09 July 2014 11:02 UTC

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From: Emil Ivov <emcho@jitsi.org>
Date: Wed, 09 Jul 2014 13:02:29 +0200
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To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [rtcweb] Security Architecture: IdP for RTP and RTCP
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On Tue, Jul 8, 2014 at 8:09 PM, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> wrote:
> I think that the way that we manage identity in a multi-party
> situation probably needs something different to that.  I don't see any
> particular value in terminating RTCP when you aren't also terminating
> RTP, the two are far too tightly coupled.  They shouldn't really have
> been given different names in the first place.

Adding to what others have said: this is only true today because of
the current state of things. In the SFU we are working on, we would
*love* not to terminate RTP encryption (it would mean slashing CPU
requirements by an order of magnitude at least) but we'd still need to
terminate RTCP. Not possible today but that's fixable as long as we
make sure we don't dig ourselves deeper into that hole.

Emil
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