Re: [rtcweb] [TLS] Short Authentication String for TLS/DTLS Draft

Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Fri, 14 February 2014 23:41 UTC

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From: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 18:41:18 -0500
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Cc: "rtcweb@ietf.org" <rtcweb@ietf.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [rtcweb] [TLS] Short Authentication String for TLS/DTLS Draft
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On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 6:28 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> RTCWEB WG members may be interested in the following draft:
>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miers-tls-sas-00
>
> This draft specifies a Short Authentication String feature for
> TLS and DTLS which would allow a pair of communicating
> to compare SAS values computed from the TLS/DTLS
> handshake in order to detect active attack.

I think the draft should discuss why a channel binding doesn't work.
It's hinted at in the introduction but it's a subtle point because
they are otherwise very similar.

Given that I see M. Green as an author, should I assume that the
requirement for 64 bytes of randomness for a /short/ authentication
string is to ensure that users of Dual_EC DRBG have no problems
leaking the necessary entropy to a passive observer? :)


Cheers

AGL