Re: [rtcweb] Final plea about SRTP

Magnus Westerlund <magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com> Fri, 04 May 2012 11:53 UTC

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Date: Fri, 04 May 2012 13:52:56 +0200
From: Magnus Westerlund <magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com>
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To: "Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)" <lists@infosecurity.ch>
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Subject: Re: [rtcweb] Final plea about SRTP
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Fabio,

Yes the topics you raise are all suitable for continued discussion and
for future determination of what the consensus is on those.

Cheers

Magnus Westerlund
(As WG chair)



On 2012-05-04 08:30, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote:
> On 5/4/12 8:21 AM, Magnus Westerlund wrote:
>> Hi Roman,
>>
>> In my role as a WG chair I have to say that the decision to make SRTP
>> mandatory to use for WebRTC had a very strong consensus behind it. Yes,
>> there are some few individuals like yourself that are on the rough side
>> of this decision.
>>
>> My personal opinion is that the discussion so far in this thread has
>> raised most of the issues with supporting both. I think the bid-down
>> problem is one of the largest for most people. I also see a great
>> benefit with always using SRTP, in that we will get rid of RTP profile
>> negotiation. There will be no need to support any other RTP profile than
>> SAVPF.
> 
> So next main points to be defined, as far as i understand, is by
> consensus working on key exchange methods that could be more or less:
> - Use only DTLS-SRTP (as it is)
> - Use only DTLS-SRTP-EKT
> - Use DTLS-SRTP + SDES-SRTP
> 
> Other than this i would also suggest to suggest discussing about the
> "Authentication" of the call, that currently with DTLS-SRTP can be:
> - Based on idP (external identity provide)
> - Unauthorized
> 
> I would also introduce the ability to verify the DTLS-SRTP call directly
> and without intermediary (no trusted third party like idP), with methods
> such as SAS.
> 
> That's the only way to achieve the "end-to-end security" property that
> DTLS-SRTP would like to bring in WebRTC standard.
> 
> Otherwise DTLS-SRTP will provide "end-to-end encryption with end-to-site
> security" but NO end-to-end security.
> 
> Fabio
> _______________________________________________
> rtcweb mailing list
> rtcweb@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rtcweb
> 
> 


-- 

Magnus Westerlund

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