Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candidates

youenn fablet <youennf@gmail.com> Tue, 03 July 2018 16:29 UTC

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From: youenn fablet <youennf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 03 Jul 2018 09:21:22 -0700
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To: Justin Uberti <juberti@google.com>
Cc: youenn fablet <yfablet@apple.com>, RTCWeb IETF <rtcweb@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [rtcweb] Security implications of host candidates
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>
> Maybe I don't understand the attack well enough, but if a page running in
> a private browsing context tried to communicate with a page not running in
> a private browsing context, they would probably see < 1ms RTTs for both
> host-host and srflx-srflx candidates in many cases (including cases where
> the contexts are on different machines).
>

This is probably true for good ethernet connections.
Connections over wifi have usually a bigger/less stable latency than local
loop connections.
I uploaded a small example (
https://evening-thicket-98446.herokuapp.com/src/content/peerconnection/datachannel-b2b/)
that computes ping-pong host-host latency through data channel.