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[rtcweb] Consent freshness - revisiting the RTCP option

Harald Alvestrand <harald@alvestrand.no> Tue, 08 May 2012 21:54 UTC

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Date: Tue, 08 May 2012 23:54:32 +0200
From: Harald Alvestrand <harald@alvestrand.no>
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Subject: [rtcweb] Consent freshness - revisiting the RTCP option
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Just because I realized I didnt understand something, I ask.....

We rejected RTCP RR as a consent freshness mechanism because RR is 
trivial to fake.
But - now we have SRTP as mandatory-to-use, which means that all RTCP 
RRs are integrity protected, origin authenticated and replay protected 
(do I have that right?).

What is the reason why this is not sufficient protection to use RTCP RR 
as a consent freshness mechanism?

                         Harald

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