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Re: [rtcweb] Consensus call regarding media security

"Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)" <lists@infosecurity.ch> Thu, 29 March 2012 17:31 UTC

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Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2012 19:31:46 +0200
From: "Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)" <lists@infosecurity.ch>
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To: "Ravindran, Parthasarathi" <pravindran@sonusnet.com>
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Cc: "<rtcweb@ietf.org>" <rtcweb@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [rtcweb] Consensus call regarding media security
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On 3/29/12 7:02 PM, Ravindran, Parthasarathi wrote:
> WebRTC trust model has to be considered as one of the main factor for deciding the key mechanism. AFAIK, SDES does not fit into WebRTC as Dr.Evil HTTPS RTCWeb server must be trusted in case of SDES. There is no means to track or analyze whether Dr.Evil involves in monitoring or recording or terminate the media traffic.  It will be good in case whoever advocate for SDES explain how SDES fits within WebRTC trust model.

Sure!

From:
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-arch/?include_text=1

"   The basic assumption of this architecture is that network resources
   exist in a hierarchy of trust, rooted in the browser, which serves as
   the user's TRUSTED COMPUTING BASE (TCB).  Any security property which
   the user wishes to have enforced must be ultimately guaranteed by the
   browser (or transitively by some property the browser verifies)."

So, it means that if the browser already have a hierarchy of trust to
use TLS for HTTPS, then SDES-SRTP will inherit the trust-properties of
the HTTPS website from which it's loaded.

It seems to me quite easy to fit SDES-SRTP into the browser model, as it
allow you to assure that the communication path between the client and
the server is secure.

Do you expect WebRTC to be only peer-to-peer/client-to-client?

I sincerly expect *a lot* of communications to goes trough SIP/RTP media
proxy for security purpose, for billing purposes, for value added
service purpose.

SDES-SRTP provide a very reliable and simple way to let a WebRTC peer to
establish security with the server, assuming that it already have
established security trough HTTPS/TLS that's a consolidate trust method.


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