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Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use

Iñaki Baz Castillo <ibc@aliax.net> Wed, 11 January 2012 11:08 UTC

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From: Iñaki Baz Castillo <ibc@aliax.net>
Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2012 12:07:54 +0100
Message-ID: <CALiegfn07bS58B+4ZyzRTnO4LCpw1e96dnqpSM+TT1y3QG2Zwg@mail.gmail.com>
To: "Ravindran, Parthasarathi" <pravindran@sonusnet.com>
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Cc: "rtcweb@ietf.org" <rtcweb@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use
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2012/1/11 Ravindran, Parthasarathi <pravindran@sonusnet.com>:
> Human user who "Press the 'Accept unsecure communication' button
> and you will win a car !!!" will allow RTP plug-in to install or
> configure browser to win the car. It is as good as sending the
> air ticket money to unknown country king based on spam mail in
> secured (https) e-mail access user for getting lump sum money
> from King (spammer).

Right. My question is: why to allow that? wasn't a primary aim of
WebRTC to avoid such a risk?


> Also, please note that SRTP-DTLS does not prevent WebRTC server
> from accessing the secured WebRTC media (data) but helps user to
> identify that the media is not end-to-end. My statement is based
> on my understanding of WebRTC security architecture
>
> Partha(Browser +  JS) ----------WebRTCserver-----Browser+ JS (Inaki)
>      |                                                          |
>       ----(SRTP+DTLS)-----WebRTC Media server---(SRTP+DTLS) -----
>
> In the above topology, webserver owns WebRTC media server as well.
> Web media server terminates & originates the media. The identity is
> the differentiating factor. For example, if I see the browser window
> with identity ibc@gmail.com instead of ibc@aliax.net, then I have to
> understand that browser is not end-to-end because of identity.

Well, I expect that the typicall picture will not include the "WebRTC
Media Server" (it could however).


> My current argument has nothing to do with PSTN interop. AFAIK,
> SRTP-DTLS standardization in WebRTC is good for SBC :-).

Ok, but I'm not talking about that. I'm just wondering why the human
user should be able to "trust" a website asking permission for
untrusted/insecure plain RTP. This is not about having a media server
or not.

Example: I'm in an airport with open WiFi. If I establish a plain RTP
communication anyone in that network can inspect it. Why to allow
that?

I repeat my main argument against allowing plain RTP:

The double encryption is not a problem at all. The application (the
browser) performs SRTP encryption (no problem here!) and the TCP/IP
stack in the computer or in the router performs network encryption.
Which is the problem??? There is no problem at all.

-- 
Iñaki Baz Castillo
<ibc@aliax.net>

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