Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use
Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com> Thu, 05 January 2012 17:12 UTC
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Date: Thu, 05 Jan 2012 09:12:22 -0800
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From: Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com>
To: Bernard Aboba <bernard_aboba@hotmail.com>
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Cc: rtcweb@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use
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Hi Bernard, The threading must have gotten mixed up here, because the responses below are to me, not Justin. Some further discussion in-line. On Thu, Jan 5, 2012 at 12:03 AM, Bernard Aboba <bernard_aboba@hotmail.com> wrote: > > Justin said: > > > Are they easier or harder to deploy than SRTP? > > [BA] Having been involved in deployment of millions of SRTP endpoints, I > wouldn't say SRTP is hard to deploy. Virtually *all* the pain comes from > key management. > > The same thing is true of IKE/IPsec by the way. When people complain about > IPsec, they almost always are talking about an IKE issue. > > Thanks for the clarification. But if we accept the current threat model (untrusted JS, where we wish to avoid revealing the SRTP keys to the application), I'm not sure that there is any way to avoid this pain. > Justin said: > > "If you could provide text for the use > case/scenarios draft that illustrates one and explain why, that would > be very useful in moving this discussion forward." > > [BA] It's not hard to come up with scenarios where SRTP might be fine, but > DTLS/SRTP would be burdensome. > > PSTN gateways are a good example of that. Some support SRTP today, and > almost all of these do SDES. If we > insisted, we could probably get some vendors to support ICE too. But asking > for DTLS/SRTP (especially a variant > different from the one implemented in SIP) is highly unlikely. > I agree that increasing the number of variants will be a pain for gateway operators. If there is something currently is deployed and meets the threat model, I am sure that there would be interest. But shifting to something that reveals the keys to an untrusted part of the system seems to be the wrong approach for solving the problem, at least to me personally. > Justin said: > > "Until then, I think the Danvers Doctrine pretty plainly pushes us to > make SRTP mandatory to implement." > > [BA] No objection to mandating implementation here. SRTP is implemented in > sub-$100 devices, so it's no big deal. > > > The key question is whether is whether it is: always on; default on; > negotiated on. I am not > personally persuaded that "negotiated on" makes for easier debugging > of the resulting system, at least in the common case. > > [BA] I'm not sure how we can avoid the possibility of "negotiation" in > signaling unless we adopt a pure media security approach (e.g. ZRTP). > As long as it is possible to use offer/answer, you'll have the potential to > "negotiate" SDES, DTLS/SRTP (SIP Flavor), etc. > Well, we've agreed to offer/answer as the basic model, but I think we're still discussing whether that means that includes negotiation of SRTP vs. RTP. > > Justin said: > > "To me, it increases the number of possible attacks and thus the code needed > to mitigate them." > > [BA] Are you saying that a DTLS/SRTP variant integrated with Oath or other > identity schemes would require minimal code and would interoperate > seamlessly??? > Nope, I'm saying that supporting that *plus* a negotiation that allows for vanilla RTP means we have to add other protections against bid down attacks. Those protections men more code. Hope that clarifies things, Ted
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Xavier Marjou
- [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Xavier Marjou
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Eric Rescorla
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Iñaki Baz Castillo
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Markus.Isomaki
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Xavier Marjou
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Igor Faynberg
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Roy, Radhika R USA CIV (US)
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Eric Rescorla
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Harald Alvestrand
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Randell Jesup
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Markus.Isomaki
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Randell Jesup
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Justin Uberti
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Bernard Aboba
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Bernard Aboba
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Ted Hardie
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Eric Rescorla
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Bernard Aboba
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Eric Rescorla
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Bernard Aboba
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Randell Jesup
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Roman Shpount
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Alan Johnston
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Roman Shpount
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Bernard Aboba
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Ted Hardie
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Ted Hardie
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Bernard Aboba
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Roman Shpount
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Justin Uberti
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Olle E. Johansson
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Randell Jesup
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Stefan Hakansson LK
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Ravindran, Parthasarathi
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Harald Alvestrand
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Bernard Aboba
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Bernard Aboba
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Bernard Aboba
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Roman Shpount
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Bernard Aboba
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Cullen Jennings
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Kevin P. Fleming
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Alan Johnston
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Ted Hardie
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Randell Jesup
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Bernard Aboba
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Bernard Aboba
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Bernard Aboba
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Ravindran, Parthasarathi
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Spencer Dawkins
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Ravindran, Parthasarathi
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Muthu Arul Mozhi Perumal (mperumal)
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Eric Rescorla
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Ravindran, Parthasarathi
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Iñaki Baz Castillo
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Ravindran, Parthasarathi
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Iñaki Baz Castillo
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Ravindran, Parthasarathi
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Justin Uberti
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Bernard Aboba
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Randell Jesup
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Bernard Aboba
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Bernard Aboba
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Eric Rescorla
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Roman Shpount
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Randell Jesup
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Roman Shpount
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Bernard Aboba
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Roman Shpount
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Justin Uberti
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Justin Uberti
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Roman Shpount
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Roman Shpount
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Eric Rescorla
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Ravindran, Parthasarathi
- [rtcweb] JSEP draft query [was RE: SRTP not manda… Ravindran, Parthasarathi
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Cullen Jennings
- [rtcweb] state of libsrtp maintenance? (Re: SRTP … Harald Alvestrand
- Re: [rtcweb] JSEP draft query [was RE: SRTP not m… Harald Alvestrand
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP DTLS - SIPit Olle E. Johansson
- Re: [rtcweb] JSEP draft query [was RE: SRTP not m… Ravindran, Parthasarathi
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Ravindran, Parthasarathi
- Re: [rtcweb] state of libsrtp maintenance? (Re: S… Roman Shpount
- Re: [rtcweb] state of libsrtp maintenance? (Re: S… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP DTLS - SIPit Eric Rescorla
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP DTLS - SIPit Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [rtcweb] state of libsrtp maintenance? (Re: S… Roman Shpount
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Oscar Ohlsson
- Re: [rtcweb] state of libsrtp maintenance? (Re: S… Randell Jesup
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Ted Hardie
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Eric Rescorla
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Harald Alvestrand
- Re: [rtcweb] SRTP not mandatory-to-use Oscar Ohlsson
- Re: [rtcweb] Security analysis of RTCWEB Bernard Aboba
- Re: [rtcweb] Security analysis of RTCWEB Eric Rescorla
- Re: [rtcweb] Security analysis of RTCWEB Igor Faynberg
- Re: [rtcweb] Security analysis of RTCWEB Bernard Aboba
- Re: [rtcweb] state of libsrtp maintenance? (Re: S… Cullen Jennings