Re: [rtcweb] End-to-end encryption vs end-to-end authentication (DTLS-SRTP / SDES-SRTP)
Iñaki Baz Castillo <ibc@aliax.net> Thu, 05 April 2012 17:44 UTC
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From: Iñaki Baz Castillo <ibc@aliax.net>
Date: Thu, 05 Apr 2012 19:43:52 +0200
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To: Roman Shpount <roman@telurix.com>
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Cc: rtcweb@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [rtcweb] End-to-end encryption vs end-to-end authentication (DTLS-SRTP / SDES-SRTP)
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2012/4/5 Roman Shpount <roman@telurix.com>: > On Thu, Apr 5, 2012 at 1:07 PM, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) > <lists@infosecurity.ch> wrote: >> >> This means that DTLS-SRTP, from a trust-model point of view, does not >> provide end-to-end security because there will always be a trusted third >> party able to authorize Man in the Middle to do eavesdropping. > > > Incorrect. If fingerprint is exposed and can be verified, DTLS-SRTP does > provide end-to-end security. No third parties involved. The fingerprint is included in the SDP which goes throught the Web server, right? You know what I mean ;) -- Iñaki Baz Castillo <ibc@aliax.net>
- Re: [rtcweb] End-to-end encryption vs end-to-end … Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
- [rtcweb] End-to-end encryption vs end-to-end auth… Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
- Re: [rtcweb] End-to-end encryption vs end-to-end … Igor Faynberg
- Re: [rtcweb] End-to-end encryption vs end-to-end … Roman Shpount
- Re: [rtcweb] End-to-end encryption vs end-to-end … Iñaki Baz Castillo
- Re: [rtcweb] End-to-end encryption vs end-to-end … Igor Faynberg
- Re: [rtcweb] End-to-end encryption vs end-to-end … Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
- Re: [rtcweb] End-to-end encryption vs end-to-end … Roman Shpount
- Re: [rtcweb] End-to-end encryption vs end-to-end … Iñaki Baz Castillo
- Re: [rtcweb] End-to-end encryption vs end-to-end … Roman Shpount
- Re: [rtcweb] End-to-end encryption vs end-to-end … Iñaki Baz Castillo
- Re: [rtcweb] End-to-end encryption vs end-to-end … Ravindran, Parthasarathi