Re: [rtcweb] additional ICE info

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Tue, 01 October 2013 21:51 UTC

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Date: Tue, 01 Oct 2013 14:51:39 -0700
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
To: Harald Alvestrand <harald@alvestrand.no>
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Subject: Re: [rtcweb] additional ICE info
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On 24 September 2013 23:15, Harald Alvestrand <harald@alvestrand.no> wrote:
>
> The existence of that (public) document explains some strange features
> of some earlier Microsoft proposals that I was never able to get an
> explanation for.
>
> This approach (which seems to have many of the properties of RSVP) seems
> to offer a solution to some problems that people have been solving by
> snooping SIP (which is impossible if SIP isn't used, and very hard when
> all the SIP channels are encrypted). Is there a chance that we could get
> public-stable specification of the required pieces, so that other
> companies can dare to depend on it?

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-mmusic-rtcweb-bw-consent-00

I've had interest in this from other people.  It is currently framed
as a mitigation for an attack, but it turns out that the TURN
allocation sizing is probably the most interesting part, since the
consent mechanism provides a fairly effective mitigation mechanism.
Especially if we define a new STUN error code that can be used to
provide immediate consent termination.

It's less generic than the malice draft, which I find compelling,
though I know generality is appealing to some people.