Re: [rtcweb] No a=ice-lite in JSEP-04

Justin Uberti <juberti@google.com> Thu, 03 October 2013 18:59 UTC

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References: <56C2F665D49E0341B9DF5938005ACDF811144C@DEMUMBX005.nsn-intra.net> <CALiegfn+u-LD=W1S2te6UB1+u6yd7xAbpKO_U=qUEsD-aWv6cw@mail.gmail.com> <CAOJ7v-2UHjitspwzJ_nzdDXwN_ZoVAk=86O98khhhoOdAtVhiA@mail.gmail.com> <7594FB04B1934943A5C02806D1A2204B1C4B37B8@ESESSMB209.ericsson.se> <2F515906-BEC6-4ACA-BF2B-172E6ADBDAF1@phonefromhere.com> <CALiegf=EmbKX7KPffa79eDn4zFxuZBkNFNsh-aX-iTecob7v6Q@mail.gmail.com> <54B5DF36-6BEE-4FA4-ACA1-D4912F9A49AB@nostrum.com> <524D94E0.7020801@matthew.at> <7594FB04B1934943A5C02806D1A2204B1C4B3AEC@ESESSMB209.ericsson.se> <7594FB04B1934943A5C02806D1A2204B1C4B3C06@ESESSMB209.ericsson.se> <524DACC4.8060901@alvestrand.no>
From: Justin Uberti <juberti@google.com>
Date: Thu, 03 Oct 2013 11:49:16 -0700
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To: Harald Alvestrand <harald@alvestrand.no>
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Cc: "rtcweb@ietf.org" <rtcweb@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [rtcweb] No a=ice-lite in JSEP-04
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Agree with Harald, although I don't like the terms "browser"/"non-browser",
since many folks (us included) are making native versions of the WebRTC
APIs available, which should conform to the same rules as their web
brethren.

WebRTC implementations (basically, anything exposing a WebRTC API) MUST
support full ICE, and MUST not support ICE Lite.
WebRTC-compatible endpoints (e.g. gateways) MAY support ICE Lite.




On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 10:43 AM, Harald Alvestrand <harald@alvestrand.no>wrote:

>  On 10/03/2013 06:48 PM, Christer Holmberg wrote:
>
>  What I think we DO need to say (eventhough someone may think it's
> obvious) , in the continous consent spec, is that ICE-lite entities do not
> send cc STUN requests.
>
>
> Hm. If correct: What are the consequences of that?
>
> It seems to me that the entity sending cc STUN requests is the one asking
> for permission (although I may have misremembered something). So this means
> that if there are no cc STUN requests coming from the ice-lite end, the
> ice-lite end is neither requesting permission to contine to send, nor is it
> going to stop sending when the WebRTC end tries to revoke permission.
>
> With the security guarantees we've been trying to work in here, where it's
> safe to execute Javascript because there's a limit to how much damage you
> can do with it.... I reach this conclusion:
>
> Entities that implement the WebRTC API, and allow others' Javascript to
> access that API (for brevity's sake, let's call them "browsers", even
> though W3C tends to call them "UAs") MUST NOT implement ice-lite. No matter
> whether they have a public IP address or not; if they implement ice-lite,
> they can't offer the security guarantees we want.
>
> Entities that don't offer an API that allows third parties to start
> connections from it (for brevity, "non-browsers") have to be taken over in
> other ways in order to perform an attack anyway, in which case all the
> WebRTC guarantees are shot - so there's no harm in allowing them to
> implement ice-lite.
>
>
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
>
> Christer
>
>
> ------------------------------
> *From:* rtcweb-bounces@ietf.org [rtcweb-bounces@ietf.org] on behalf of
> Christer Holmberg [christer.holmberg@ericsson.com]
> *Sent:* Thursday, 03 October 2013 7:30 PM
> *To:* Matthew Kaufman; rtcweb@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: [rtcweb] No a=ice-lite in JSEP-04
>
>   Hi,
>
>
>
> Do we really need to say more than the ICE RFC already says? I think it
> explains when ICE-lite is appropriate, and when it isn't.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
>
> Christer
>
>
>
>
>  ------------------------------
> *From:* rtcweb-bounces@ietf.org [rtcweb-bounces@ietf.org] on behalf of
> Matthew Kaufman [matthew@matthew.at]
> *Sent:* Thursday, 03 October 2013 7:01 PM
> *To:* rtcweb@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: [rtcweb] No a=ice-lite in JSEP-04
>
>   On 10/3/2013 7:53 AM, Adam Roach wrote:
> > On Oct 3, 2013, at 9:31, Iñaki Baz Castillo <ibc@aliax.net><ibc@aliax.net>wrote:
> >
> >> If I implement my own WebRTC stack in a smartphone app, am I disallowed
> to do ICE-lite in my side??
> > I would hope so, yes. The chance that your smartphone app would have any
> hope if working if it did ice lite are as close to zero as to make no
> difference.
> >
> > The fact that implementors apparently don't see this as an obvious fact
> tells me that we need pretty strong language around this prohibition, and
> "browser" is clearly too narrow a scope.
> >
> >
>
> The spec should say that:
> 1. The prohibition on sending media prior to completing a STUN
> connectivity test is a MUST
> 2. A full ICE implementation is a SHOULD
>
> If I'm building a system with clients at one end and gateways with
> public addresses at the other, a full ICE implementation isn't required
> anywhere in order to make calls through those gateways. But keeping the
> browser from being able to spew media at something that hasn't consented
> *is* required.
>
> Matthew Kaufman
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>
>
> _______________________________________________
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>
>
>
> --
> Surveillance is pervasive. Go Dark.
>
>
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