Re: [rtcweb] Use Case draft (privacy)

"Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)" <lists@infosecurity.ch> Mon, 30 April 2012 09:04 UTC

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Date: Mon, 30 Apr 2012 11:04:33 +0200
From: "Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)" <lists@infosecurity.ch>
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Subject: Re: [rtcweb] Use Case draft (privacy)
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On 4/27/12 6:35 PM, Jim Barnett wrote:
> I would like to see a corporate call center use case.  Specifically, a
> user downloads a web page from a corporate web site, clicks a 'call us'
> button and is connected to a gateway server that is controlled by the
> corporation.  The communication up to the corporate boundary cannot be
> eavesdropped, but, inside the corporate boundary:  1) the corporation
> can route the call to whoever it wants (meaning that the caller can
> verify that he is connected to the corporation, but is not necessarily
> assured of the identity of the person he is speaking to within the
> corporation) 2) the corporation can eavesdrop/record the call (n.b. this
> is mandatory in financial institutions, and common in most others). 

In that case, from a privacy perspective, it's HIGHLY RELEVANT to show
in the UI to the user that the call does it's encrypted up to a gateway
and not up to another peer.

Please get back the thread on end-to-end vs end-to-site security.

The user *must known and be aware* if a call is secured between two
peers or if it's not secured up to a gateway (and who control such a
gateway).

Fabio