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Re: [rtcweb] No Interim on SDES at this juncture

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Thu, 20 June 2013 23:36 UTC

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Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2013 16:36:37 -0700
Message-ID: <CABkgnnWrygFQJyhPREk=hG2TLUS3pgmYhaC=Ozy0ekdMaay2ng@mail.gmail.com>
From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
To: "Hutton, Andrew" <andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com>
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Cc: "rtcweb@ietf.org" <rtcweb@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [rtcweb] No Interim on SDES at this juncture
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On 20 June 2013 14:25, Hutton, Andrew
<andrew.hutton@siemens-enterprise.com> wrote:
> Using SRTP is always more secure than using plain RTP but again I think the
> problem to be solved is how the user is notified about the level of risk.

I'm fairly sure that the levels of trust can be very easily enumerated:

Do you trust the site? (i.e., default access level on getUserMedia or
a session that uses SDES)

Do you trust some other guy?  Where the identity of the other guy is
provided. (peerIdentity/noaccess constraint on getUserMedia, and
DTLS-SRTP, and - if it isn't a domain name - an identity provider)

Given that either default access levels on gUM or use of SDES to be
equivalent, and I think that they are to a reasonable approximation,
then the security story for SDES isn't that weak.

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