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From: Cullen Jennings <fluffy@iii.ca>
In-Reply-To: <CA+9kkMCUVwC-uRe_pR2_M2DgNDfxCNNRihRApPzCji4PaeJtKg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 18:38:14 -0600
Cc: RTCWeb IETF <rtcweb@ietf.org>, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>,
 Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com>
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References: <CA+9kkMCUVwC-uRe_pR2_M2DgNDfxCNNRihRApPzCji4PaeJtKg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rtcweb/osBgDWzJsqJa-ghrF1d0QpCFaQs>
Subject: Re: [rtcweb] Security-arch IdP determination issue/DISCUSS
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I agree this change makes sense. It is so easy to get domain names and =
certs and SNI is so widely adopted that I do not see many arguments =
against this.=20

> On Apr 9, 2019, at 11:59 AM, Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
> In section 7.5 of the Security-arch draft, the document says:
>=20
> Authority:  The authority [RFC3986 =
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986>] at which the IdP's service is
>       hosted.  Note that this may include a non-default port or a
>       userinfo component, but neither will be available in a =
certificate
>       verifying the site.
>=20
> Benjamin Kaduk raised a DISCUSS on this:
> I'm a bit unclear about how the port in the=20
> IdP URI's Authority (Section 7.5) would get=20
> discovered. If it can be remotely supplied,=20
> there may be risks in just trusting blindly=20
> whatever value is received.
>=20
> Given that we discover this via a .well-known location which is meant =
to be deterministic, I went looking for the more general .well-known =
advice on this topic.  Turns out that the updated version in 578bis =
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nottingham-rfc5785bis-09#page-2> has =
this:
>=20
> Typically, applications will use the default port=20
> for the given scheme; if an alternative port is=20
> used, it MUST be explicitly specified by the=20
> application in question.
>=20
> Obviously, our doc predates 5785bis, but given the discuss and that =
advice, I think the right thing to do here is to drop the ability to =
have a non-default port or to specify an alternate port.
>=20
> Is there anyone currently using this with a non-default port?
>=20
> Any objections to dropping this or preferences for specifying an =
alternate port?
>=20
> regards,
>=20
> Ted
> _______________________________________________
> rtcweb mailing list
> rtcweb@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rtcweb


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div>I agree this change makes sense. It is =
so easy to get domain names and certs and SNI is so widely adopted that =
I do not see many arguments against this.&nbsp;<br class=3D""><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">On Apr =
9, 2019, at 11:59 AM, Ted Hardie &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ted.ietf@gmail.com"=
 class=3D"">ted.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif" class=3D"">I<span =
style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif" class=3D"">n</span> =
section 7.5 of the Security-arch draft, the document =
says:</span></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D""><pre class=3D"gmail-newpage">Authority:  The authority [<a =
href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986" title=3D"&quot;Uniform =
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax&quot;" class=3D"">RFC3986</a>] =
at which the IdP's service is
      hosted.  Note that this may include a non-default port or a
      userinfo component, but neither will be available in a certificate
      verifying the site.<br class=3D""><br class=3D""></pre><pre =
class=3D"gmail-newpage"><font face=3D"arial,helvetica,sans-serif" =
class=3D"">Benjamin Kaduk raised a DISCUSS on this:<br =
class=3D""></font></pre><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">I'm a bit unclear about how the port =
in the <br class=3D"">IdP URI's Authority (Section 7.5) would get <br =
class=3D"">discovered.  If it can be remotely supplied, <br =
class=3D"">there may be risks in just trusting blindly <br =
class=3D"">whatever value is received.<br =
class=3D""></blockquote></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Given that we discover this via a .well-known location which =
is meant to be deterministic, I went looking for the more general =
.well-known advice on this topic.&nbsp; Turns out that the updated =
version in <a =
href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nottingham-rfc5785bis-09#page-2"=
 target=3D"_blank" class=3D"">578bis</a> has this:</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Typically, applications will use the =
default port <br class=3D"">for the given scheme; if an alternative port =
is <br class=3D"">used, it MUST be explicitly specified by the <br =
class=3D"">application in question.<br class=3D""></blockquote><pre =
class=3D"gmail-m_8568968848071411641gmail-ballot =
gmail-m_8568968848071411641gmail-pasted"><br class=3D""></pre>Obviously, =
our doc predates 5785bis, but given the discuss and that advice, I think =
the right thing to do here is to drop the ability to have a non-default =
port or to specify an alternate port.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Is there anyone currently using this =
with a non-default port?</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Any objections to dropping this or preferences for specifying =
an alternate port?</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">regards,</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Ted<br class=3D""></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">rtcweb =
mailing list<br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:rtcweb@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">rtcweb@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rtcweb<br =
class=3D""></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></body></html>=

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