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Re: [rtcweb] SDP Security Descriptions (RFC 4568) and RTCWeb

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Fri, 26 April 2013 20:21 UTC

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Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2013 13:20:48 -0700
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
To: Tim Panton <tim@phonefromhere.com>
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Cc: "rtcweb@ietf.org" <rtcweb@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [rtcweb] SDP Security Descriptions (RFC 4568) and RTCWeb
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On 26 April 2013 13:10, Tim Panton <tim@phonefromhere.com> wrote:
> On 26 Apr 2013, at 20:45, Roman Shpount wrote:
>> Pre-warming connection before user consent has some security implications as
>> well. I would much rather see a mechanism to do ICE setup and DTLS key
>> exchange at the same time. Should we look into extending ICE/STUN to carry
>> public/private key exchange?
>
>
> That's interesting, I'd have to have a _long_ talk with ekr about the
> security risks in that.

That the essence of http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-rtcweb-ice-dtls-00

In theory, it's possible to squash ICE and DTLS to save round trips.
In practice, it mucks with software layering in nasty ways.

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