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Re: [rtcweb] Consent alternative

"Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)" <tireddy@cisco.com> Wed, 22 January 2014 17:01 UTC

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From: "Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)" <tireddy@cisco.com>
To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [rtcweb] Consent alternative
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Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2014 17:01:22 +0000
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Cc: "Cullen Jennings (fluffy)" <fluffy@cisco.com>, "rtcweb@ietf.org" <rtcweb@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [rtcweb] Consent alternative
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Hi Martin,

Please see inline

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Martin Thomson [mailto:martin.thomson@gmail.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, January 22, 2014 8:11 PM
> To: Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)
> Cc: Muthu Arul Mozhi Perumal (mperumal); Cullen Jennings (fluffy);
> rtcweb@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [rtcweb] Consent alternative
> 
> On 22 January 2014 13:29, Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)
> <tireddy@cisco.com> wrote:
> > If we consider B attacker is also capable of sniffing packets on wire,
> > DTLS heartbeat does not have any benefit over STUN consent because B
> > can sniff the DTLS heartbeat request sent by A and generate response.
> 
> This is not correct, but not really important either.  DTLS ensures that an on-
> path attacker is unable to observe or insert packets.  If B is on-path and able
> to read signaling, it can return STUN consent.
> But we've already determined that on-path attackers aren't interesting when
> it comes to DoS.

I am still referring to off-path attacker only who can sniff packets and spoof IP address but cannot modify or consume packets.

-Tiru.

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