Re: [rtcweb] Consent alternative

["Muthu Arul Mozhi Perumal (mperumal)" <[e-mail]>]

That's a typical third party call control (3PCC) use case where B (3PCC) mangles call signaling + SDP b/w A and C and sets up the media session between them. The security of ICE (as defined in RFC5245) is rooted in the ice-ufrag and ice-pwd exchanged in call signaling. If a 3PCC can mangle them, ICE can't prevent the connectivity check from succeeding.

If it is deemed a problem, it might need an ICE extension to fail the connectivity check b/w A and C.

Muthu

From: Martin Thomson [mailto:[e-mail]]
Sent: Tuesday, December 03, 2013 11:08 AM
To: Muthu Arul Mozhi Perumal (mperumal)
Cc: [e-mail]; Magnus Westerlund; Cullen Jennings (fluffy)
Subject: RE: [rtcweb] Consent alternative


I think that you misunderstood. This looks like a restarted ICE to A (from B), but it is really an entirely new session to C. It completes because C is unwittingly duped into briefly visiting B's page, which only needs to be long enough to clear a single connectivity check.

On Dec 2, 2013 8:30 PM, "Muthu Arul Mozhi Perumal (mperumal)" <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>
> |2. B (the attacker) triggers an "ICE restart" with A, though really
> |this generates a new ICE negotiation with a victim, C.  C consents to
> |talk to B, but not necessarily with A.  This arrangement is easy to
> |achieve on the drive-by web.
> |
> |3. A completes ICE with C and expects to continue the DTLS connection
> |over the newly discovered 5-tuple.
>
> Assuming this is a regular ICE restart, the STUN binding requests sent as part of the ICE connectivity checks from A to C would have randomly generated transaction IDs. Unless B is on the A-C path or can guess those transaction IDs, it wouldn't be able to generate legitimate binding responses to cause ICE to conclude b/w A and C.
>
> Muthu
>
> |-----Original Message-----
> |From: rtcweb [mailto:[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>] On Behalf Of Martin Thomson
> |Sent: Tuesday, December 03, 2013 4:14 AM
> |To: Magnus Westerlund
> |Cc: Cullen Jennings (fluffy); [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>
> |Subject: Re: [rtcweb] Consent alternative
> |
> |On 29 November 2013 05:40, Magnus Westerlund
> |<[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
> |> I have looked briefly on this and wonder if this isn't vulnerable to
> |> active attacks from a attacker (Alice) that likes to use a set of WebRTC
> |> browsers, including (Bob) to generate DDOS traffic towards the target
> |> (Charlie).
> |
> |Hi Magnus,
> |
> |I think that you did manage to hit on something critical here.
> |
> |The basic security primitive in play with ICE consent is proof of
> |receipt.  That is the key piece at play here as well.  We require
> |proof of receipt simply because that elevates the requirements for an
> |attacker to the point that they have to basically be on-path.  At that
> |point, they (likely) already have the ability to generate traffic
> |toward a victim of an equal (or maybe greater) volume to the sender
> |and gain little by mounting the attack.
> |
> |That's why I'm not particularly interested in the part where you talk
> |about attackers intercepting binding requests.
> |
> |The actual attack that you have hit upon (or caused me to think about)
> |is not quite as you described, but it does rely on the fact that the
> |proposed change to the consent mechanism no longer actively depends on
> |proof of receipt.
> |
> |It also relies on the possibility that a DTLS connection can be moved
> |without requiring proof of receipt on the new path.  That, to me, is
> |the fundamental problem to be solved.  From my reread of RFC 6347, it
> |appears as though the only consideration given to DoS was at the
> |handshake.  Once something like ICE is in play (and MICE makes this
> |worse), the ability to "move" the connection presents an attacker with
> |an opportunity.  (I have to point out that this also confirms my fears
> |about the mechanism used to signal ICE restarts, but I'll get back to
> |that.)
> |
> |Here is the attack as I understand it:
> |
> |1. A talks to B, establishing a DTLS connection using ICE.  There is
> |no need for lots of data to flow at this point, this is the "warm-up"
> |phase of the attack.
> |
> |2. B (the attacker) triggers an "ICE restart" with A, though really
> |this generates a new ICE negotiation with a victim, C.  C consents to
> |talk to B, but not necessarily with A.  This arrangement is easy to
> |achieve on the drive-by web.
> |
> |3. A completes ICE with C and expects to continue the DTLS connection
> |over the newly discovered 5-tuple.  C is confused, but really has no
> |recourse at this point.  Even if the DTLS connection fails, C is now
> |the victim on the other end of an unending stream of bits.  B spoofs
> |the source address of the necessary packets to continue consent, A
> |continues to send to C, and nothing that C does can stop the flood
> |because they don't have access to the master secret and cannot
> |therefore produce an authenticated packet that terminates the
> |connection.  B can continue the attack as long as A is willing, at the
> |bargain-basement price of a (spoofed) DTLS heartbeat response every
> |10-20 seconds.
> |
> |The key here is the lack of a proof of receipt from A toward C for the
> |DTLS connection that is moved.  There is nothing inherent to DTLS that
> |provides proof that C received data from A and is also willing to
> |continue to communicate... Almost.
> |
> |The DTLS heartbeat extension does provide such a thing:
> |http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6520#page-6
> |
> |All we need to do to close this little loophole is to require that a
> |DTLS heartbeat request be sent after any change in underlying 5-tuple.
> | That request MUST contain sufficient entropy that guessing would be
> |difficult for an off-path attacker; noting that this is also covered
> |by TLS record layer encryption and authentication, limiting the number
> |of parties that are even allowed to make a guess.  I'm a big fan of
> |128 bits, but less is almost certainly OK.  If no response is received
> |within N seconds, consent is expired.  The basic consent timer seems
> |appropriate here, i.e., N=30.
> |
> |DTLS renegotiation would also work, but I consider that to be a little
> |heavyweight.  I'm not sure that it's that widely implemented either.
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