Re: [rtcweb] RFC 6520 vs. draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-00

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Wed, 27 November 2013 17:55 UTC

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Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2013 09:55:21 -0800
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
To: "Muthu Arul Mozhi Perumal (mperumal)" <mperumal@cisco.com>
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Cc: "draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness@tools.ietf.org>, "rtcweb@ietf.org" <rtcweb@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [rtcweb] RFC 6520 vs. draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-00
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On 27 November 2013 09:38, Muthu Arul Mozhi Perumal (mperumal)
<mperumal@cisco.com> wrote:
> From a security perspective, I don't see a real advantage of one over the other.

That's right, they are equivalent.  Unless you consider the risk of a
preimage attack on SHA-1 within the confines of the STUN message size
limit to be a realistic.  (I don't.)

Equivalence on security is only the first order bit upon which we decide.