< draft-ietf-bfd-vxlan-08.txt   draft-ietf-bfd-vxlan-09.txt >
BFD S. Pallagatti, Ed. BFD S. Pallagatti, Ed.
Internet-Draft VMware Internet-Draft VMware
Intended status: Standards Track S. Paragiri Intended status: Standards Track S. Paragiri
Expires: May 4, 2020 Individual Contributor Expires: May 22, 2020 Individual Contributor
V. Govindan V. Govindan
M. Mudigonda M. Mudigonda
Cisco Cisco
G. Mirsky G. Mirsky
ZTE Corp. ZTE Corp.
November 1, 2019 November 19, 2019
BFD for VXLAN BFD for VXLAN
draft-ietf-bfd-vxlan-08 draft-ietf-bfd-vxlan-09
Abstract Abstract
This document describes the use of the Bidirectional Forwarding This document describes the use of the Bidirectional Forwarding
Detection (BFD) protocol in point-to-point Virtual eXtensible Local Detection (BFD) protocol in point-to-point Virtual eXtensible Local
Area Network (VXLAN) tunnels forming up an overlay network. Area Network (VXLAN) tunnels forming up an overlay network.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on May 22, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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The document requires setting the inner IP TTL to 1, which could be The document requires setting the inner IP TTL to 1, which could be
used as a DDoS attack vector. Thus the implementation MUST have used as a DDoS attack vector. Thus the implementation MUST have
throttling in place to control the rate of BFD Control packets sent throttling in place to control the rate of BFD Control packets sent
to the control plane. On the other hand, over-aggressive throttling to the control plane. On the other hand, over-aggressive throttling
of BFD Control packets may become the cause of the inability to form of BFD Control packets may become the cause of the inability to form
and maintain BFD session at scale. Hence, throttling of BFD Control and maintain BFD session at scale. Hence, throttling of BFD Control
packets SHOULD be adjusted to permit BFD to work according to its packets SHOULD be adjusted to permit BFD to work according to its
procedures. procedures.
This document recommends using an address from the Internal host
loopback addresses range as the destination IP address in the inner
IP header . Using such address prevents the forwarding of the
encapsulated BFD control message by a transient node in case the
VXLAN tunnel is broken as according to [RFC1812]:
A router SHOULD NOT forward, except over a loopback interface, any
packet that has a destination address on network 127. A router
MAY have a switch that allows the network manager to disable these
checks. If such a switch is provided, it MUST default to
performing the checks.
If the implementation supports establishing multiple BFD sessions If the implementation supports establishing multiple BFD sessions
between the same pair of VTEPs, there SHOULD be a mechanism to between the same pair of VTEPs, there SHOULD be a mechanism to
control the maximum number of such sessions that can be active at the control the maximum number of such sessions that can be active at the
same time. same time.
Other than inner IP TTL set to 1 and limit the number of BFD sessions Other than inner IP TTL set to 1 and limit the number of BFD sessions
between the same pair of VTEPs, this specification does not raise any between the same pair of VTEPs, this specification does not raise any
additional security issues beyond those of the specifications additional security issues beyond those of the specifications
referred to in the list of normative references. referred to in the list of normative references.
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reviews and feedback on this material. reviews and feedback on this material.
Authors would also like to thank Nobo Akiya, Marc Binderberger, Authors would also like to thank Nobo Akiya, Marc Binderberger,
Shahram Davari, Donald E. Eastlake 3rd, and Anoop Ghanwani for the Shahram Davari, Donald E. Eastlake 3rd, and Anoop Ghanwani for the
extensive reviews and the most detailed and helpful comments. extensive reviews and the most detailed and helpful comments.
12. References 12. References
12.1. Normative References 12.1. Normative References
[RFC1812] Baker, F., Ed., "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers",
RFC 1812, DOI 10.17487/RFC1812, June 1995,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1812>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5880] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection [RFC5880] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(BFD)", RFC 5880, DOI 10.17487/RFC5880, June 2010, (BFD)", RFC 5880, DOI 10.17487/RFC5880, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880>.
[RFC5881] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection [RFC5881] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
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